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Caine: The Liberal Agenda

"The Liberal Agenda": Biblical Values and the First
Amendment
Burton Caine'
At a recent conference of the National Jewish Law
Students Association, a student expressed surprise and

appreciation that one advocating the "liberal" point of view could
quote the Bible in support of that position. The implication was
that "real" or "knowledgeable" Jews - often mentioned
interchangeably with "Orthodox," "pious," or even "observant"
Jews, are all on the right. Without even defining terms, the
assumption is that these American Jews, motivated by religion
and Zionism, support and become the "settlers" on the West Bank

(often referred to in their Biblical nomenclature as "Judah and
Samaria"), advocate government aid to Jewish religious schools
and practices in the United States, and are the only real stalwarts

for Jewish life at home and abroad.2

The stereotype then

I Professor of Law, Temple Law School; Harvard Law School,
J.D., 1952;
Director, Temple-Tel Aviv Universities Law Program.
2 See Itamar Rabinovich, As Israel Tilts to the Right, Envoy to U.S. Makes an
Exit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at 9. Professor Rabinovich, formerly Rector
of Tel Aviv University, upon retiring as Israel's ambassador to the United
States, noted that Jews both in Israel and the United States are "adivided
society" along the lines of liberals on the one hand, and Orthodox who support
the policies of the Netanyahu government on the other. Id. "Liberal
Jews.. .have a broader agenda," observed Rabinovich, and he singled out 'the
Lubavitch Hasidic group, 'who take their cue from religious leaders in
America.'" Id. From his description of his struggle to counter the lobbying of
such American Jews, Professor Rabinovich would agree with the theses of this
article. Id. Attacks by the ultra-Orthodox in Israel upon Justice Aharon
Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, and the Court in general,
reflect policies which mirror those of American Orthodox Jews, as discussed
in this article. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, Israeli High Court Under Attack
by Religious Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1996, at Al (calling Barak a new
dictator and a dangerous enemy); Joel Greenberg, Israel Court Backs NonOrthodox on Conversions, N.Y. TIES, Nov. 13, 1995, at Al; Jerusalem
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proceeds to excoriate "liberals" who oppose these ideas and ideals
for lack of knowledge of,3 and loyalty to Judaism and hide behind
Constitutional or other doctrine as an excuse.
This picture is false and highly deleterious to the health of
the Jewish polity.

It stifles the debate which is the lifeblood of

democratic society. Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in Whitney v.
California that the answer to speech is more speech, not
suppression, and "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people." 5 He implied - and certainly would have said if called
upon - that history, tradition and the Bible itself cannot be
expropriated by one side of any debate or be held captive to any
political argument. The underlying assumption that "liberalism"
6

is alien to Jewish thought is a canard. Jewish students of the law
should be proud to carry the banner of "liberalism" and take
inspiration from the Tanah and the Jewish experience. That has
been my credo as one with a life-long devotion to civil liberties

and to Judaism.7
Road is Secular-Religious Battleground, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1996, at Al;
Mishpat B'rosh Gadol, HA-ARET'Z, Aug. 17, 1996, at 17 (contending that
Orthodox attacks on Justice Barak are unjustified); Netty C. Gross, Justice on
the Firing Line, The Death Threats Against Israel's Top Judge Represents an
Ultra-OrthodoxAttack on the Liberal Judiciary He Heads, JERUSALEM REP.,
Oct. 3, 1996, at 26.
3
"Am ha-aretz," roughly translated as "ignoramus" when
it comes to
Judaism, is often the term applied.
4
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
5 Id.
at 375.
6 See Peter Seinfels, Battling for the Backing of Judaism in the United States'
Cultural Wars, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1995, at A14 (contending that most
American Jews subscribe to the "liberal" agenda, including positions the
author argues for in this article). However, "a large segment of the Orthodox,
plus a battalion of increasingly conservative intellectuals have challenged these
positions as 'liberal pieties' that ...
contradict Jewish interests. Both Jewish
camps ...
contend that they have Jewish tradition on their sine." Id.
7 See, e.g., Ass'n of Jewish New Ams.
v. Cawood, No. 79 Civ. 618 (E.D.
Pa. 1979). The author of this article has been active in the American Civil
Liberties Union and have served as General Counsel and President of the
Greater Philadelphia Chapter. As Counsel, he defended the right of the Nazis
to march in front of the Liberty Bell, proclaiming their hideous message of
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This article presents two themes.

The first is that our

passion for justice, freedom and individual liberty comes from the
Bible itself. The second is that the First Amendment' guarantees
of freedom of speech and separation of church and state are not
only the crowning jewels of our democratic system, they are also
"good for the Jews." The corollary is that Jews should actively
participate in the struggle to protect these freedoms, and certainly

should not endeavor to weaken, circumvent, or destroy them. 9
In my view, unfortunately, Jews, and in particular
Orthodox Jewish groups, have engaged in actions which have the
effect, if not the purpose, of endangering First Amendment
liberties of Freedom of Speech, and the Establishment Clause
mandating the separation of church and state. As to the latter, I
have specified in separate subsections of the article, six areas in
which activities inimical to Establishment Clause values have

taken place, namely, 1) placing religious symbols in public
places, 2) obtaining or attempting to obtain public support including - financial aid for religious schools, 3) getting the

death to the Jews. Having visited all the major Nazi death camps, the author
understands fully the horrors of the Holocaust.
Professor Caine has also been President of Solomon Schechter Day
School in Philadelphia, and for the past 18 years has been the director of the
Israel Program at Temple Law School which includes teaching in Israel every
summer. On behalf of Soviet Jewry, he has visited the USSR twice and was
active as a lawyer for Anatoly Sharansky. The author has lectured throughout
the world on Constitutional Law, mainly on behalf of the United States
Government, and also twice before the judges of Israel in Hebrew.
8 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment
provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
9 See Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court,
N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 5, 1997 at 1, 60. The author agrees with Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsberg, acknowledged to be a "liberal face" and "progressive" on the
Supreme Court when she "values 'the age-old connection between Judaism and
law.'" Id. Justice Ginsberg notes, "The demand for justice runs through the
entirety of the Jewish tradition." Id. See also What Bring Jewish Means to
Me, A New Year's Message from the American Jewish Committee, N.Y.
TImEs, Oct. 8, 1997, at A13.
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legislature to gerrymander a school district for Orthodox Jews,'0
4)supporting prayer in public schools, 5) closing public schools
on Jewish holidays, and 6) using government to enforce the rules
of kashrut, that is, Jewish religious prescriptions for kosher food.
Further, I submit that even discrimination against Jews in
violation of their right to free exercise of religion is no excuse for
engaging in activities in violation of the Establishment Clause.
I. Passion for Justice, Freedom and Individual Liberty comes
from the Bible itself.
Fundamental principles of law and freedom that Americans
trace to the Constitution have clear antecedents in the Bible. That
the American Charter of Liberty was "law," was decided in 1803
in Marbury v. Madison,I but the Torah is also a self-defined
"law" as proclaimed in Exodus 12:49, "There shall be one law
for the citizen and the stranger who dwells among you."' 2

The idea of a people with a destiny of freedom was
already dramatically portrayed in the Exodus saga of the
liberation of Hebrew slaves from Egyptian bondage and their
transformation into a free and independent nation. The holiday of
Passover was not only a triumph of the Children of Israel and
their God but was the model for other nations struggling to
achieve freedom. The Great Seal of the United States with the
depiction of a pyramid of Egypt should serve as a reminder of
that momentous event.
The Ten Commandments, although normally considered
to be a moral and religious code, depicts God as liberator, and it
was divine intercession that enabled Moses to provide the model
10Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding that the Supreme Court has the
power of judicial review, that is, the power to invalidate an act of Congress
because it violates the Constitution and determining that the Constitution is law
and therefore the judiciary has the authority to determinate whether other
branches of government have complied with it).
12 Exodus 12:49. All translations from the
Bible, unless otherwise noted, are
II

from TANAKH (The Jewish Publication Society 1985).
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for our founding fathers. National liberation is a recurring
premise in the modem world for constitutions and declarations of
independence. 3
I believe it goes even further. The sacred and majestic
Biblical ideal that justice is the cornerstone of society found its
The prophet Amos
way into the American Constitution.
proclaims, "But let justice well up like water, Righteousness like
an unfailing stream."" Rulers - even God himself - must measure
up to its standards. When God set about to destroy Sodom and
Gomorrah for their unspeakable transgressions, Abraham
confronted the Supreme Magistrate, "Shall not the Judge of all
the earth deal justly?"" The prophets showed a distaste for kings
because, as Lord Acton was later to observe, "absolute power
corrupts absolutely." 6 That power inevitably breeds evil and
oppression is echoed in the basic design of American government
- to protect the people from tyranny.

Through the Prophet Elijah, God inveighed against King
Ahab for seizing the vineyard of Naboth, an act of injustice that
brought disaster upon the king and his evil wife, Jezebel.' 7 This
is not simply a tale of overreaching royalty. Even without
specific adumbration, the unstated quintessential premise is that
ordinary people have certain inalienable rights. Why else would
King Ahab sulk and whine when his offer to buy his subject's

See SIMON GREENBERG, THE ETHICAL IN THE JEWISH AND AMERICAN
HERITAGE (The Jewish Theological Seminary of America 1977). The late
Rabbi Simon Greenberg was very perceptive in seeing the connection between
the Bible, on the one hand, and the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence on the other.
14Amos 5:24. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA,
A Speech for the Liberty of
Unlicensed Printing,To the Parliamentof England (1644): "Truth is compared
in Scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual
progression, they sicken into a muddy pooi of conformity and tradition." THE
PORTABLE MILTON 186 (D. Bush ed., The Viking Press 1949).
13

15
16
17

Genesis 18:25.

LORD ACTON, ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 364 (H. Finer ed., 1948).
1 Kings 21.
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vineyard was so saucily spurned? M Did not ancient monarchs
have power to seize what their hearts desired? Here, the royal
house did not act in a totally arbitrary manner. Naboth's
vineyard was adjacent to palace grounds 9 and would have
enhanced them in a way not unlike modern appropriations of
lands in similar circumstances. Also, the offer for payment was
more than modem suitors would get in a judicial proceeding,
namely, land of superior value or cash.20 Queen Jezebel, too, for
all her brazen promises to get the vineyard for her husband,' did
not even urge King Ahab to exercise what one might assume to
be his royal prerogative, and take the property by force. Instead,
she concocted a scheme for two witnesses to give false testimony
that Naboth "reviled God and king!""

When Naboth was convicted and executed by stoning,
King Ahab went to "inherit" the vineyard.' 3 There he was met by
the Prophet Elijah who castigated him with one of the most
wrathful of Biblical judgments, "God has said, 'Would you
murder and take possession? ... In the very place where the dogs

lapped up Naboth's blood, the dogs will lap up your blood too.'"
24

One should read this story, I believe, as the forerunner of
constitutionalism in the sense of a restraint on government power
to abuse individuals. In the argot of our times, the Biblical tale is
suffused with notions of the "unalienable rights" Thomas
Jefferson proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and
which later were translated in civil liberties protected by the
Constitution.

1I

Kings 21:4.
I Kings 21:2.
20 1 Kings 21:3.
21 1 Kings 21:7.
22 1 Kings 21:10.
19

23

1 Kings 21:18.

24

1 Kings 21:19.
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Perhaps the entire concept is an axiom of the Biblical
story of creation, "And God created man in his own image. ""
The idea that everyone is a divine creation requires that
government respect the human personality. In political terms, it
emphasizes that the most important words in the Constitution are
at the very beginning, "We the people," meaning: the people are
the master and the government is the servant. Accordingly, in
my view, the most exalted term in the document is "person,"
whom the Constitution makes sovereign. The term appears in the
Fifth 6 and Fourteenth" Amendments to signify the most
fundamental rights of an individual in our society.28
Nor should one ignore the obvious parallel between
Elijah's rebuke of the king and Alexander Hamilton's classic
characterization of judicial power under the Constitution of the
has no influence over either the
United States: "The judiciary ...

sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever.
It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment...."29
The parallel is that the ultimate power in a society under law is
the word, not force. Neither Elijah nor the Supreme Court of the
United States relies upon physical power to enforce its judgments,
although ultimately it may have to resort to such power. Elijah
confronts the king with judgment based upon an understood and
Genesis 1:27.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part:
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
"No person shall ...
process of law..." Id. (emphasis added).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "IN]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " Id. (emphasis added).
28 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyer, The Supreme Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause extends even to children of illegal aliens,
rejecting the argument that only citizens of the United States were the intended
beneficiaries. Id.
29 ALEXANDER HAMMTON, THE FEDERALisT No. 78, at 15
(Gerald Gunther
ed., 1991).
25
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accepted notion of justice. As was said above, even before the
prophet announces God's punishment, he pronounces God's
verdict, "Would you murder and take possession?" And Ahab
knows that justice limits his power to seize property he so
passionately desires. He further knows that Jezebel is also a
violator and that the legal proceedings she has set in motion lack
the component of justice. There is no discussion on the point, it
is merely understood. Ahab does not contest the verdict nor
resist the judgment.
The word in the American system operates in similar
fashion. The courts dispense justice by rendering judgments and
with reasons designed to convince the people that those decisions
are correct and should command both respect and obedience.
There is good reason to believe that the writers of the
United States Constitution knew Bible."
"Proclaim liberty
throughout the land unto all the inhabitants thereof Lev 25:10"
was inscribed on the Liberty Bell, and sentiments behind that
choice were significant in moving John Adams to declare in his
correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, "[T]he Hebrews have
done more to civilize men than any other nation. ,,31

Declarations and tradition alone cannot create a
democracy dedicated to liberty, nor can they sustain it. Justice
Thurgood Marshall observed that it was the American people
who breathed life into the spare and arid phrases of the Founding
Fathers, transforming their chary prose into a glorious Charter of
Liberty." Implicit in this observation is the profound idea that no
30

See

EDWIN WOLF II & MAXWELL WHITEMAN, THE HISTORY
OF THE JEWS

IN PHILADELPHIA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE AGE OF JACKSON,

16-18, 29,

35, 224, 306-11 (Jewish Publication Society of America 1956).
9

WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS

609, quoted in 1
184 (Funk and Wagnalls Co. 1901).

31

32

THE JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA

THURGOOD MARSHALL,

UNITED STATES

REFLECTIONS ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE
CONSTITUTION, Address at the Annual Seminar of the San

Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association (May 6, 1987), quoted in

101 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1987).

What Justice Cardozo wrote about Chief

Justice John Marshall, is also applicable to his namesake here, "He gave to the

constitution of the United States the impress of his own mind; ... because he
molded it ... in the fire of his own intense convictions."
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constitution is capable of creating or conferring human rights and certainly not the American document. 33
The bulk of the Constitution is devoted to granting the
federal government just so much of the people's power needed to
enable it to carry out the people's purposes as set forth in the
Preamble of the document. The principal aspiration is to "secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

Curiously, there was nothing in the original Constitution spelling
out how these "Blessings of Liberty" were to be secured, and the

word "liberty" is not mentioned again until the Bill of Rights was
added years later. Even then, when it comes to what is perhaps
our most fundamental right, freedom of speech, the First
Amendment does not say that the people have such right. What it
says is, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."

The choice of words is deliberate. James Madison, who
wrote the First Amendment, certainly understood that the right to
basic freedoms was not born in the Constitution. ' Justice

CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 169-170

(Yale University

Press 1921).
33

See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J.,

dissenting) (stating "Mhe Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to
'create' rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our
Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be preexisting.").
See also U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment provides as follows:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id.
See generally ANATOLY SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL (Random House
1988). The author learned this lesson in Moscow when he went to advocate
for Anatoly Sharansky. Jewish "refuseniks" proclaimed that they were free
because they exercised their human rights to speak out for freedom. When he
reacted that they sounded like Americans vindicating their First Amendment
rights, they then gave this law professor a lesson in Constitutional Law he
shall never forget. They said that prisoners in the harshest conditions of their
travail spoke out and maintained their dignity as free souls. No documents
gave them those rights. They had them because they were human beings and
were valiant enough to act as such.
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William 0. Douglas wrote in Griswold v. Connecticut,3S one of
our greatest civil rights decisions, that fundamental rights are
older than the Constitution of the United States.36 Justice Brennan
echoed the same theme that the right to be free is not conferred
by government - it is implicit in being a human being.37
The Constitution is an everlasting reminder of that
fundamental idea, and read together with the Declaration of
Independence, that fiery birth announcement of a nation with an
unalienable right to deliverance from tyranny, form the American
credo that freedom is both the natural state of humanity and its
destiny, and that government is instituted to protect that destiny.
That, in my view, is the theory of our Constitution.
The idea that negative imperatives against abuses of
authority are designed to preserve natural conditions of freedom
has a close parallel in the Biblical text of Leviticus, Chapter 19,
and in particular verses 15 and 18. There, as Professor Moshe
Greenberg has pointed out in "Al Hamikra V'al Hayahadut,"3 8 a
series of "You shall not's"' 9 are commanded for the purpose of
clearing the way for the flowering of the affirmatives, such as,
"judge your kinsman fairly," and climaxing with, "Love your
fellow as yourself."40 Greenberg comments, "In these instances,
it is clear that the 'You shall not' is nothing but a reservation

381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding
use of
contraception was an intrusion on a person's right to marital privacy).
36 Id. at 486.
3S

37

See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 288.

38 MosH

GREENBERG, AL HAMIKRA V'AL HAYAHADUT [ON

THE BIBLE AND

JUDAISM] (Avraham Shapira ed., Am Oved 1984).
39 Leviticus 19:15. Verse 15 reads: "You shall not render
an unfair decision;
do not favor the poor or show deference to the rich; j';dge your kinsman
fairly." Id. See also Leviticus 19:18. "You shall not take vengeance or bear
a grudge against your countrymen. Love your fellow as yourself." Id.
40 MOSHE GREENBERG, The Question of the Freedom of the
Servant of the
Lord in the Bible, in AL HAMIKRA V'AL HAYAHADUT [ON THE BIBLE AND
JUDAISM] 85, 89 (Avraham Shapira ed., Am Oved 1984).
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negativing the existence of the 'You shall';' the 'You shall not'
clears away the thorns and weeds that prevent the flourishing of
the "You shall... It is the condition for the realization of the
affirmative values which the Torah establishes." 2
Benjamin Franklin, at the conclusion of the Constitutional
convention, summed up its work with a warning. The Founders,
he said, created "a republic, if you can keep it."' 3 Perhaps Judge
Learned Hand, in his celebrated essay, The Spirit of Liberty," said
it more explicitly, "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it;
no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there,
it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it."'s
I believe that the same thought is conveyed by the Bible in
the famous injunction in the book of Deuteronomy, "Justice,
justice shall you pursue!" 4 Attention is often drawn to the
drumbeat repetition of the noun "justice" and the placement of the
double imperative at the beginning of the sentence for added
import, thus thrice emphasizing its importance as a precept in the
Biblical regime. But the traditional interpretation of the verse
and an impercipient English translation obscures the deeper
significance of the passage.
The phrase comes at the end of a list of six commands
pertaining to the administration of justice, beginning with the
appointment of judges. Following is a direct command to judges
Id. The Jewish Publication Society translation, which is used throughout
this article, in the verses of Leviticus here relevant, sometimes translates the
negatives as "You shall not..." or "Do not..." and the affirmatives as "You
41

shall..." or simply the verb itself without the "You shall...," such as "Love

your fellow..." Professor Greenberg's references to "You shall..." and "You
shall not..." are intended to cover all such negatives and all such affirrmatives
with the JPS distinction.

Id.
43 11 AMERICAN HisTo~icAL REviEW
618 (J.F. Jameson ed., 1906).
" LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 690 (I. Dilliard ed.,
1952).
Id.
42

46 Deuteronomy 16:20.
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to do justice 47, in the plural as one would expect. At the end, the
injunction to pursue justice is in the singular, indicating that it is
directed not to the courts but to each of us individually, a thought
confirmed by the explanation "in order that you shall live and
inherit the land which the Lord your God gives you." The
obligation is imposed on the people to do whatever is necessary to
pursue justice, and even to correct injustice committed by the
government, including the judges.
Such was the understanding of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. whose vision of a free and just society was neither daunted
nor dimmed by a benighted judiciary. In keeping with the
Biblical and Constitutional command, he acted upon his beliefs.
Rosa Parks did likewise. By following the command, she
brought on a new dawn of human dignity. The pursuit of justice
motivated the American people not to accept the Dred Scott
decision of the Supreme Court 41 that denied humanity to a
runaway slave. The Fourteenth Amendment not only reversed
that decision but also added immeasurably to the explicit
guarantees of equality and fair treatment for each of us. 49 Also,
the experience of Japanese-Americans during World War If0 and
47

Deuteronomy 16:18-19.

Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857).
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment
adopted in
1868 states that all persons born in the United States are citizens - thus
48

reversing Dred Scott - and goes on to provide that no state shall deprive any

person of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, due
process of law, and the equal protection of the law.
so After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt

issued an

Executive Order authorizing the military to exclude persons of Japanese
ancestry from designated West Coast areas, impose curfews, etc.
In
Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S.
214 (1944), the curfew and exclusion aspects of the program were upheld.

The pursuit of justice with respect to these victims was desultory, taking the
better part of five decades. It was not until 1984 that Korematsu's conviction
was reversed because the government had submitted false information to the

Supreme Court in the original case. Id. See Korematsu v. U.S., 584 F. Supp.
1406 (N.D.Cal. 1984). In 1986, Hirabayashi's conviction for failing to
register for evacuation was reversed, but the conviction for curfew violation
was left standing. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash.
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the continuing struggle for equal rights for women in this
country5 ' are illustrations of the role the Fourteenth Amendment
has played in the expansion of personal rights.
Under the American concept of democracy, the people
have the ultimate power, and therefore the ultimate responsibility
to see that freedom and justice are achieved. The Constitution is
bottomed on the premise that government cannot be trusted to

preserve our liberties and do justice; that the people deserve the
blame if we allow our servants to do evil in our name; that the
people are responsible for correcting the iniquities of government

in accordance with the principles we set for ourselves in our
Charter of Liberty. The ideal of "We the People" has been
glossed by the wisdom of the sages, including the admonition of
Learned Hand, the teaching of Justice Thurgood Marshall, and
the Biblical charge to pursue Justice.

Justice Brandeis said it best in Whitney v. California:?
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free .... They valued

liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be
the secret of liberty...; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people.53

1986). In 1988, Congress enacted the Civil Liberties Act, 102 Stat. 903, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1989-1989(d) (1988), apologizing for the fundamental injustice
inflicted upon Americans of Japanese extraction, and providing for
reparations). But at least now the verdict of history has been entered that this
honorable community was the victim of unmitigated racial prejudice. See
generally PETER IRONS, JUSnCE AT WAR (1983).
51 The pursuit of justice was evident again
in the long and continuing struggle
of women for equality. It was not until the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920
that women were guaranteed the right to vote, 50 years after the Fifteenth
Amendment assured the same right for men of all races. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIX. The pursuit of justice has still not achieved an Equal Rights Amendment
guaranteeing equality regardless of gender where men as well as women would
be the beneficiaries.
52 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
53 Id. at 375 (deserving to be quoted again
in fuller context for emphasis).
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I believe that the responsibility to do justice - coming from
a Biblical command addressed individually to each of us - falls
with particular weight upon each Jew. If our society is to achieve
its exalted goals, Jewish lawyers - equipped by learning and
training to achieve those noble precepts of freedom, equality, and
human dignity - cannot be "inert", and must actively participate
in the struggle. Keeping before us always the guiding principles
of human dignity is more important than prescribing the result of
each application.
II.

The Constitution of the United States and the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
separation of church and state are not only the crowning
jewels of our democratic system, they are also good for
the Jews. Jews should actively participate in the struggle
to protect these freedoms, and certainly should not
endeavor to weaken, circumvent, or even destroy them.

There are two conflicting principles in our Constitution:
First, the principle of democracy. That is, majority rules. This
serves well when the question is how we choose our leaders and
how they decide what legislation furthers the public welfare. The
second principle - and equally precious - is the protection of

individual liberty against the majority. Here, the majority loses
when it comes to fundamental rights. This is the theme of the
Bill of Rights. Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America
said that the crowning jewel in the diadem of the American legal
system was judicial review, which enables the judiciary to protect
individual and minority rights against "the tyranny of the
majority." 4
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 260-261
(Bradley
ed., 1945). De Tochqueville observed:
54

When a man or a party suffers an injustice in the United States, to
whom can he turn? To public opinion? That is what forms the
majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority and
obeys it blindly. To the executive power? It is appointed by the
majority and serves as its passionate instrument. To the police? They
are nothing but the majority under arms. A jury? A jury is the
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The anti-majoritarian provision will surely be the more
important principle when history judges the success of the
American experiment in government. Although James Madison,
who wrote both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and
Thomas Jefferson, a guiding spirit in the struggle to protect
individual liberties, were gloomy on the effectiveness of a stated
Bill of Rights, both concurred that it was essential to make the
effort. Jefferson put his faith in a learned and independent
judiciary who, fortified with life tenure, would stand up for the

individual
the inevitable abuses by governmental
. 51 against
authority.
Justice Jackson's stirring rhetoric serves as a potent
reminder that:
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to

withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
majority vested with the right to pronounce judgment; even the judges
in certain states are elected by the majority.
Id. See also Burton Caine, Judicial Review - Democracy Versus
Constitutionality,56 TEPLE L.Q. 297, 325 (1983).
55 See THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN
STATE, 5-6 (Epstein, Stone,
Sunstein eds., Univ. of Chi. 1992). There, Geoffrey Stone comments in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS INTHE WELFARE STATE: A BiCENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM, 5-6,
that Madison was doubtful that a bill of rights would make a difference. He
wrote to Jefferson in 1788, "experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights
on those occasions when its control is most needed," offering as an illustration
.repeated violations of these parchment barriers ... committed by overbearing
majorities" whenever circumstances allow. Id. But he offered the Bill of
Rights for two reasons. First, they would be treasured by the judiciary, those
"independent tribunals of justice would consider themselves ... guardians of
these Rights;" the courts would serve as "an impenetrable bulwark against
every [unwarranted] assumption of power," they would "sniff the approach of
tyranny in every tainted breeze," and "would be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution." Id.
Second, A bill of rights would serve an essential educational function in a self
governing society. Id.
Jefferson emphasized "the legal check which [such a Bill would put] into the
hands of the judiciary ... which if rendered independent ... merits great

confidence for their learning and integrity." 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
This was the "winning argument.'
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (Foundation Press
1988).
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political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property,
to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections. 56

Justice Jackson sums it up in language no schoolchild should fail
to memorize:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. 7
As a result, in the United States we do not vote on
whether a person has the right to speak. We do not vote on
whether a person has the right to worship or not; nor may we
prescribe the form of worship. We do not vote on whether a
person is entitled to a fair trial, or the right to be treated fairly.
If the entire nation and all its officials were to act to deprive one
person of any of these rights, the individual would win. We have
constitutionalized the adage of John Stuart Mill, "If all mankind
minus one were of one opinion and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that person than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind."58

56

57
58

West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. t)24, 638 (1943).
Id. at 641.
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO
320 (Margaret E.

Hall ed., Fallon Publishers 1947) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY,
303 (H. Class, Eliot eds., 1909)).
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A. Freedom of Speech
That First Amendment rights are guaranteed as against the
majority should be especially meaningful to Jews, who have been
persecuted, expelled, and even exterminated in virtually every
country in which they have lived with the exception of the United
States. And in the United States, as a minority, Jews have little
hope of winning a popular election and therefore must seek
redress through the courts, which were designed to be the
bulwarks of freedom especially in times of repression and stress.
That explains why Jewish lawyers defended the First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech for the American Nazi
Party, and to march in Skokie, Illinois, a town with a substantial
population of Holocaust survivors. Viewed in a wider context,
that was a proud moment in the history of defending
Constitutional freedoms, no matter how scurrilous and despicable
the Nazi ideology, especially for Jews. The lesson is that
expression cannot be stifled no matter how "unpopular" the
message, or no matter how much the majority finds it hideous.
Jewish tradition in defending unpopular speech can be
traced to the Bible and the Mishnah. In Deuteronomy, Chapter
1759 local judges are instructed to follow the law as given by the
Sanhedrin, the equivalent of the Supreme Court of today. And
those who act "presumptively" 60 in disobedience are subject to the
extreme penalty. The all important qualifying adverb is taken by
the Mishnah to affirm freedom of speech for the judge to openly
disagree with the superior ruling.

61

Israel Supreme Court Justice

Deuteronomy, 17: 8, et seq.
Deuteronomy 17:12.
61 Masehet Sanhedrin 11:2 SHISHA SIDREI MISHNAH 207 (Albeck ed., The
59
60

Bialik Institute and Dvir Co.1959).

See also Deuteronomy, THE JPS

COMMENTARY 165 n.12 (Jeffrey H. Tigay trans., The Jewish Publication
Society 1996).
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Menachem Elon, in his treatise on Jewish Law 62 explains the
doctrine of the "rebellious elder" 63 with the following summary:
This is the teaching of the Jewish heritage in
regard to leadership and government - that all
persons and groups should be treated tolerantly,
with respect for their views and world outlook.
This is the great secret of tolerance and respect for
the opinion of others, and the right of each
individual and group to freedom of speech.6
Jews should not shy away from defending free speech for
Nazis, no matter how painful that may be. Aryeh Neier,
Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union during
the Skokie events, in his book, Defending My Enemy65 , explained
in detail that freedom for hateful thoughts is necessary to
guaranty free speech for lofty ideals. Neier's parents were
Hebrew teachers in Germany who escaped from Hitler. He
understood the virulence of Nazi doctrine. But he maintained that
it was not the failure to curb Nazi speech which led to the
Holocaust, rather it was the refusal to stop the unlawful actions in
fulfillment of the Nazi plan, subsequently termed "the final
solution of the Jewish question."

62

MENACHEM ELON,

4

JEWISH LAW, FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH

(Bernard Auerbach & Melvin Sykes trans., Jewish Publication Society 1994).,
63 In Hebrew "rebellious elder" is "zaken mamre."
64 ELON, supra note 62, at 1846-49. A current
illustration in American law,
undoubtedly unintended, appears in ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd.
of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996), where the District Court decided that

student-initiated graduation prayer did not violate the First Amendment, and
upon reversal by the Court of Appeals, followed the mandate but insisted that

its decision was correct:
We make it clear that the opinion of the Coui. remains that

[originally] expressed. However, due regard for our "hierarchical
federal judicial system ...requires us to respect the findings of the

[Court of Appeals for the] Third Circuit."
Id. at 1476.
65

ARYEH NETER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY
(1979).
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Justice Cardozo understood the necessity for defending
speech "that we hate"6: "Aglow even yet, after the cooling time
of a century and more, is the coal from the fire that was the mind
of Voltaire: "I do not believe in a word that you say, but I will
'
defend to the death your right to say it."
On a personal note, I tried the case on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union in Philadelphia when the
American Nazi Party was granted a permit to march in front of
Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell with posters reading,
"Kill the Jews," "Finish the Job That Hitler Started," and similar
hideous messages. Suit to cancel the permit was filed by an array
of municipal authorities and Jewish organizations.t s Since the
permit was granted by the federal government, the United States
Attorney defended and the ACLU then technically speaking
entered the case as amicus curiae on behalf of the United States.
The United States Attorney made what appeared to be a
pro forma argument and the burden then shifted to ACLU to
defend in earnest the First Amendment guaranty of free speech.
Holocaust survivors were outraged that a Jewish lawyer would
defend Nazis. They and other Jews apparently felt that this
Jewish lawyer did not know what Nazis were and never heard of
the Holocaust because they brought pictures of the atrocities and
rolled up their sleeves to confront me with the numbers tattooed
on their arms. They testified that the appearance of Nazis in
uniform with jack boots and swastika would cause them severe
emotional distress bringing back vivid memories of the most
hideous scenes any human beings could experience. 9 "Does a
See generally United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). "[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free
thought -- not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate." Id. at 654-55.
67 MILL, supra note 58,
at 323.
68 Ass'n of Jewish New Ans. v. Cawood, No. 79 Civ. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
66

Professor Caine brought his students in Constitutional Law to witness the
trial so that they could understand emotionally as well as intellectually the
raging controversy over free speech for purveyors of hate. One student stood
69
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Jewish lawyer have to represent these beasts?!" I was asked. A
survivor of Auschwitz lamented, "If you were in the death camps
you could not have defended the right of Nazis to speak." I
agreed but not for the reasons intimated. The destruction in the
extermination camps was vast - the bulk of European Jewry was
murdered. It now seems that reason itself also fell victim.
Jews are a minority in the United States and need the
protection that the Bill of Rights affords. Minorities cannot rely
upon elections to secure their freedom because that is a
majoritarian process under which minorities are powerless to
protect themselves. Jews should be among the first to understand
that nowhere in the world have their rights withstood the
vicissitudes of history no matter how well they appear to be
ensconced in society. A trip to the Diaspora Museum in Tel
Aviv proves the point. The Golden Age in Spain and periods of
success and safety elsewhere ended in discrimination, expulsion,
and extermination. In the United States, 200 plus years of history
is still too short to say how secure fundamental rights for Jews
will be. Paraphrasing Justice Jackson, people have discovered no
technique for long preserving freedom except that rights of
minorities be preserved under law against the majority. Such
institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of
70
minorities to be the last, not the first, to give them up.
Jews may have been duped into thinking that in this time
of "political correctness," censoring or punishing unpopular
speech would inure to the benefit of slandered minorities, and
especially would protect Jews from anti-Semitic remarks. Many
up in the courtroom wearing a talit and a white kippah announcing that this is
how Jews are buried and that his professor was arguing for the death of the
Jewish People.
70 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
There, Justice Jackson wrote:
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered
no technique for long preserving free government except that the
Executive be under law, and that the law be made by parliamentary
deliberations. Such institutions may be destined to pass away ....
But
it is the duty of the Court to be the last, not the first, to give them up.
Id. at 655.
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Jews thought that a little repression of the fundamental right to
speak was worth the price.
The "water buffalo" and related incidents at the University

of Pennsylvania should have provided convincing proof to the
contrary.

At Penn, the Jewish ox was gored.

It should have

been expected. Denominated "the nation's most politically
correct campus,' '71 Penn punishes racist speech protected by the
Constitution. 2 Jews should have taken little comfort from the
expectation that it would be used to stifle anti-Semitic canards,
especially from African-Americans.
In a nationwide TV program entitled PoliticalCorrectness
and College Campuses,? Penn was Exhibit A. Murray Dolfrnan,
a Jewish legal studies senior lecturer at Penn's Wharton School,
was disciplined by the University because he asked AfricanAmerican students to read the Thirteenth Amendment extirpating
slavery to show the reason why contracts for employment could
not be specifically enforced. He prefaced his request by saying
David Boldt, Penn's Oracle of Optimism, PHILADELPHIA INQURER,
Sept.
12, 1995, at BI.
72 Univ. of Pennsylvania Code of Student
Conduct, Section 111(d). Penn and
Stanford, among others, maintain that as private institutions, they do not have
to obey the constitution. Contemning the American Charter of Liberty is
hardly an encomium to any university. See Ronald Dworkin's essay, Why
Academic Freedom? in FREEDOM's LAW, 244-60 (Harvard University Press
1996) (explaining that "hate speech" codes inhibit free and open exchange that
nourishes independent thought. For the University of Pennsylvania, punishing
speech which the Constitution protects is ironic since Penn advertises itself as
"Ben Franklin's University" and Benjamin Franklin was a member of the
convention which wrote the Constitution). Fortunately, every university
speech code which has been litigated has been found to violate principles of the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. Mich. 1989); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774
F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). See, e.g., Corry v. Stanford University,
No. 740309, slip op. (Ca. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Feb. 27 1995)
(holding state law incorporates principles of the First Amendment). See Court
Overturns Stanford Univ. Code Barring Bigoted Speech, N.Y. TIMEs, March
1, 1995, at B8.
73 Campus Culture Wars: Five Stories
About 'PC' (PBS television broadcast,
Sept.24, 1993).
71
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that Jews and African Americans had been slaves and therefore
should be especially sensitive to the Constitutional prohibition.

Dolfman was subjected to sensitivity training and then his
contract was not renewed. 74
In January 1993, 75 the University

initiated

formal

disciplinary action against Eden Jakobowitz, a student who called
African-American women students "water buffalo" because they
were carousing in the dormitory complex when students were
studying for exams. 76 Jakobowitz, born in Israel and yeshiva
educated, denied uttering a racist comment, saying that he was
merely translating Yeshiva censure - "behamah" - into English to

convey the idea of misbehavior.

74

See NAT HENTOFF, FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR ME BUT NOT
FOR THEE 189-

92 (1992). Hentoff blames the American Civil Liberties Union for not taking
action to protect Dolfman's rights. Id. Burton Caine was President of the
ACLU chapter referred to and never heard of the incident. Id. On checking
with Murray Dolfman, the author learned that he wanted to keep civil liberties
organizations, and especially the Jewish defense agencies, out of the affair
because he believed that he had an understanding with Sheldon Hackney, then
President of Penn, that if the matter was kept quiet and Dolfman underwent the
required "retraining," his contract would be renewed. Id. It wasn't. Dolfman
felt betrayed. Id.
75 Prior thereto came the trashing, by African-Americans,
of the entire edition
of The Daily Pennsylvanian, the student newspaper because of an article
criticizing the university's affirmative action program as unfair to whites. The
university decided to take no action against the students.
76 See Burton Caine, The Dormant First
Amendment, 2 TEMPLE POLIT. & CIV.
RTS. L. REv. 227, 244-46 (1993).
77 The Hebrew word for "water buffalo"
is "t'oh." See A. Even-Shoshan, 7
HAMEELON HEHADASH 2810 (Kiriat Sefer 1970). "T'oh" appears twice in the
Bible at Deuteronomy 14:5 and Isaiah 51:20. "Behamah" is more accurately
translated as animal - commonly, a domesticated animal - but not water
buffalo. The slang meaning is an "animal" not in the literal sense but to convey
the idea of one not observing the norms of acceptable conduct. One would
have thought that a yeshiva student and native Hebrew speaker would have
chosen one of these terms as the correct translation for "behamah." History
Professor Alan Kors defended that water buffalos come from Asia, not Africa,
and therefore the comment was not racist. He recalled that "Animal House,"
the film which satirized college life, was not a racist slur but meant disorderly
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The essential point is that Jakobowitz' speech was
protected by the First Amendment, no matter what he meant to
convey, and Penn's-refusal to obey the Constitution should have
been the issue. Penn was rescued only by the withdrawal of the
complaint by the women, not by fidelity to the Bill of Rights.
The rescue, however was temporary.
After graduation,
Jakobowitz instituted suit against the university, and the case has
been settled without trial. 78
Jews learned a lesson" which all censorship inevitably
teaches. As has been noted frequently, repressing speech is like
releasing poison gas.
The wind often changes.Wo Benjamin
students and was the appropriate linguistic equivalent of "behamah" in student
speech.
78
"WaterBuffalo' Lawsuit Settled by Penn Graduate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 10,
1997, at A16. There was no admission of wrongdoing made by the university,
and no damages paid, although Penn did agree to pay some of Mr. Jacobowitz'

legal fees. Id. See also FormerStudent Settles Suit over 'Water Buffalo' Case,
Eden Jacobowitz Had Alleged That Penn Conspired to Pursue Racial
Harassment ChargesAgainst Him, PHILADELPHIA INQUMER, Sept. 9, 1997, at
B3.
79 Or, should have learned. But in the
January 1993 incident, see note 75 et
seq. and accompanying text, many of the professors and students were Jewish,
as was the President of the University of Pennsylvania.
so Jews might have taken note of the remarks of legal philosopher
Edmond
Cahn at Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1962 against a group libel law:
The officials could begin by prosecuting anyone who distributed the
Christian Gospels, because they contain many defamatory
statements not only about Jews but also about Christians; they show
Christians failing Jesus in his hour of deepest tragedy. Then the
officials could ban Greek literature for calling the rest of the world
"barbarians." Roman authors would be suppressed because when
they were not defaming the Gallic and Teutonic tribes they were
disparaging the Italians. For obvious reasons, all Christian writers
of the Middle Ages and quite a few modem ones could meet a
similar fate. Even if an exceptional Catholic should fail to mention
the Jews, the officials would have to proceed against his works for
what he said about the Protestants and, of course, the same would
apply to Protestant views on the subject of Catholics. Then there is
Shakespeare who openly affronted the French, the Welsh, the
Danes.... Dozens of British writers from Sheridan and Dickens to
Shaw and Joyce insulted the Irish. Finally, almost every worthwhile
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Franklin summed it up, "Those who would give up essential
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither
Liberty or Safety." 8' Perhaps, Shakespeare's Macbeth is even
more profound: "Security is mortals' chiefest enemy. "'"
When Justice Brandeis wrote that the answer to speech is
more speech, not suppressing the speaker, he relied upon
"discussion.. .to avert the evil by processes of education." 3 It is a
lesson many educational institutions resist learning. The lesson is
even harder to learn when the speech at issue has enormous
emotional intensity.
B. The Separation of Church and State
The very first provision of the Bill of Rights, that is, the
First Amendment, provides, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. " ' In 1947, in Everson v.
Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court said:

item of prose and poetry published by an American Negro would
fall under the ban because it either whispered, spoke, or shouted

unkind statements about the group called "white."
Edmond Cahn, Remarks at Hebrew University of Jerusalem Against Group
Libel Law (1962) reprinted in ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY 139-40
(1979).
81

DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS FROM THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 1056

(Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1992).
82 Hectate to the three witches. WILLIAM

act 3, sc.
5, verses 32-33 (3 THE ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE 445, Rowse ed., C.N.
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH,

Potter 1978).
83 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
U.S. CONST. amend.
I
85 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Nevertheless, by
a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld
New Jersey's reimbursement for the cost of "the transpo-,ation of pupils to
both public and parochial schools." Id. at 358. The Court held that "'[the]
establishment of religion' did not prevent 'New Jersey from spending taxraised funds to pay bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general
program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools.'" Id. at 360.
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[The] "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another... . No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion... . In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion.., was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,86 the Supreme Court set forth a 3prong test government action must meet to withstand an
Establishment Clause attack: "First, [the action] must have a
secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits [religion]; finally [it] must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'

"

In elaborating upon prong 3, the Supreme Court in Meek
v. Pittenger" said that government action is in violation of this
test when it:
creates a serious potential for divisive conflict over the
issue of aid to religion - "entanglement in the broader
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

This case involved "[a]ctions challenging the
constitutionality of state aid to, or for the benefit of, nonpublic schools." Id.
The United States Supreme Court held both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes to be unconstitutional under First Amendment religion clauses because
both "involved excessive entanglement of state with church" and "posed
danger of divisive political activity and possibility of progression leading
toward the establishment of state churches and state religion." Id. at 624-25.
87 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
8 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
"[Sltatutes providing for state expenditures in
connection with the education of students in nonpublic schools" was held
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Id. The United States
Supreme Court held that "all but the textbook loan provisions of the statutes in
question violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
86
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sense of continuing political strife" .... [i.e.] political
fragmentation and division along religious lines, one of
the principal evils against which
the Establishment
89
Clause was intended to protect.
The First Amendment, as indeed the entire Constitution,
binds only the government, not private persons. However, I
suggest that the policy behind this provision of the First
Amendment is also good for the Jews and should guide their
actions. As a minority in this country Jews should adhere to,
support, and fight to protect the Establishment Clause values with
all their heart, and with all their soul, and with all their might,
and impress them upon their children. And Jews, I suggest,
should be particularly assiduous in not taking or promoting any
action which will lead to "political ... division along religious

lines, one of the principal evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to protect."9'
The United States is alone among the nations of the world
in proscribing such government help and hindrance to religion
and it should rightfully be considered America's unique
contribution to the flourishing of religious freedom. Far from
being hostile to religion, the Establishment Clause has led to the
prosperity of both religion and freedom virtually unequaled
among the countries of the earth.
Many consider the
Establishment Clause the glory of the American Constitutional
experiment.
Just as Jews should not try to suppress speech no matter
how despicable, as I have maintained above, it is decidedly in the
interest of Jews, I suggest here, to support the separation of
religion and government and not take action, nor claim for
themselves rights or privileges which undermine the policy
underlying the Establishment Clause, nor encourage others to do
so. As illustrated below, in my view Jews have not always
Id. at 372.
Deuteronomy 6:5,7 (paraphrasing the prayer, "Shema, Yisrael").
91Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S.
at 372.
89

90
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observed this admonition, and to their detriment. Often, Jews
have undermined the wall of separation of church and state
without regard for the warning that "it stands for thee."
1. Religious symbols in public places
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,9 is
a recent case which illustrates both the folly of erecting Jewish
symbols in public places and claiming the right to do so under the
free speech clause while opposing the same right for the symbols
of others; and also claiming an exemption from the Establishment
Clause for placing Jewish religious objects in public places while
opposing the same right for others. Such actions are a parade
illustration of promoting "political fragmentation and division
along religious lines, one of the principal evils against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to protect."3 Jews should not
station Hanukkah menorot at the Liberty Bell, inside a capitol
rotunda, in front of government buildings, or in other public
places, and otherwise set an example for other religions to do
likewise. Misguided Jews, largely Orthodox, have spurned this
advice, as amply illustrated below, as if the Establishment
Clause, and its command of separation of state and religion, is
itself the enemy of the Jews.4
In Pinette, a rabbi obtained a permit from the state
licensing board to erect a Hanukkah menorah in the public square
in front of the state capitol in Columbus, Ohio." The Ku Klux
Klan [hereinafter "KKK"] then applied to install a large Christian
515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding that the KKK could not be denied the right to
erect a cross in a public plaza next to the Ohio State capitol building because to
do so otherwise would be a violation of the Klan's First Amendment rights).
93Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372
(1975).
94 The policy of placing the menorah in close
proximity to symbols of the
nation and seats of power alone testifies to a purpose to create the impression
of government 'endorsement," exactly what the Establishment Clause was
92

designed to interdict. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 691-

94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95Pinette, 515 U.S. at 757-58.
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cross "because 'the Jews' were placing 'a symbol' for the Jewish
belief" in the square.9 The Jewish message was in celebration of
the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah, The Feast of Lights.7 As for
the KKK response, "[k]nowledgeable observers might regard it,
given the context, as an anti-Semitic symbol of bigotry and
disrespect for a particular religious sect.""8 Indeed, "[tjhe Klan
found the menorah offensive. "99 But asserting that difference in
opposition to the KKK display would have run headlong into the
most fundamental principle in Free Speech jurisprudence,
namely, that speech may not be censored on the basis of its
In
content, and even more so on the basis of its viewpoint.
addition, in the religious context, "government lacks the power to
judge truth of religious beliefs."' 0' The Ku Klux Klan application
was rejected by the state licensing board, which decision was
overturned by the lower federal courts, which in turn was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.'02
The issue in the Supreme Court was limited to whether the
KKK Christian cross installed in front of the state capitol violated
the First Amendment Establishment Clause calling for the
Separation of Church and State." 3 If so, the KKK cross would
not be protected expression under the freedom of speech clause.
96

Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

97

Id.

98

Id. at 798.
Id. n.2.

99

100See

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct 2510
(1995) (holding that viewpoint discrimination, meaning that which is based on
a speaker's opinion, perspective or ideology, "was a denial of the right of free
which would undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause
speech ...
requires."). Id. at 2525. See also Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
(holding that material cannot be censored just because it may be harmful,
inasmuch as the Internet cannot be censored).
101U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-89 (1944).
102.Pinette, 515
103

U.S. at 770.
That was the only issue decided in the lower courts and on which the

Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Thomas thought the KKK act was
political - that is, was intended to convey hate, not religion - suggesting that
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The case for denying a permit to the KKK on grounds of
the Establishment Clause was undermined by the erection of the
menorah. 4 How can Jews put up a religious symbol, and
Christians not, even if it is the KKK? The court by a vote of 7-2
held that the KKK free-standing cross did not violate the
Establishment Clause calling for the separation of church and
state because the other symbols there - including the menorah -

gave the impression to the public that the KKK cross was just one
of many symbols which together send a message that the state
does not necessarily endorse religion, but permits all religions to
express their own views.
I suggest that the erection of the menorah therefore
backfired and encouraged the proliferation of religious symbols in
public places.'05 This is the clear implication from a series of
lower court cases where the court used the menorah to justify the
erection of Christian religious symbols on public property often
by the government at public expense.
The most egregious of these cases, I suggest, is the recent
2-1 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 1 6 which held, that the erection of a
creche by the city in downtown Syracuse replete with the
Christian exaltation "Gloria in Deo Excelsis", bearing the name
of the mayor, and cordoned off by police barricades, nevertheless
did not constitute endorsement. In view of the Hanukkah
menorah erected nearby by Chabad Lubavitch, the majority
maintained, the message was diversity just as was in Allegheny
the Establishment Clause was not the proper issue. Id. at 771 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
104 Id. at 758.
Although the majority opinion does not so hold, it notes the
presence of the menorah as an indication that Capitol Square is a public forum
where religious as well as non-religious displays and the like are exhibited.
Id. Taking specific notice of the menorah, the author suggests, shows that its
presence is significant in Justice Scalia's opinion. It could not fail to be.
10sSee, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S.
753. See also Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 625 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[Slurely the
City cannot allow a religious group to turn a public park into an enormous
outdoor church.") (Cudahy, J., concurring).
106123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.
1997).
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County v. American Civil Liberties Union. M Pinette'° was also
cited as authority on the ground this was a public forum as
indicated by the Lubavitcher's menorah, and that invites a
diversity of views and symbols including those placed by the
The vigorous dissent by Judge Cabranes
government.
emphasizes that action by the City of Syracuse in installing a
creche alone is sufficient to amount to endorsement prohibited by
the Establishment Clause. 09
That factor was the key to the Third Circuit's
condemnation of Jersey City's display of both a creche and
menorah, even with the addition of plastic reindeer, Santa Claus,
Frosty the Snowman, and a wooden sled in its decision in
American Civil Liberties Union v. Schundler."° By erecting both
religious symbols, the Court observed, Jersey City sends a double
religious message, that is, both religions are endorsed by the
municipal authorities. The Pinette case was distinguished on the
ground that the menorah and cross were erected by private
persons in a public forum and the issue there was whether the
menorah privately installed by Lubavitchers legitimated the KKK
cross because it signaled that this was a public forum where all
private speech is guaranteed by of freedom of speech provision of
the First Amendment.
Whether the United States Supreme Court will accept the
Elewski reasoning that the Lubavitcher menorah justifies a
government creche remains to be seen. But in view of what
appears to be a Supreme Court crusade to accommodate, if not
actually to promote religion, and particularly the Christian
107

492 U.S. 573 (1989).

The Court held that "the effect ... of placing a

menorah next to a Christmas tree is to create an 'overall holiday setting' ...
[and that] if the city celebrates both Christmas and Chanukah as secular
holidays, then its conduct is beyond the reach of the establishment clause." Id.
at 614-15.
108 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
109 Elewski, 123 F.3d at 61 (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
110 104 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that adding secular exhibits to a
municipally erected display of a menorah and creche was not enough to satisfy
the constitutional prohibition against state sponsoring of religion).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/6

30

Caine: The Liberal Agenda

1997

THE LIBERAL AGENDA

religion, short of the never-to-be-reached land of "endorsement,"

creates the significant danger that history will record that the
enthusiasm with which Orthodox Jews have joined the ranks of
Onward Christian Soldiers made them essential partners in the
unholy alliance to make a shambles of the Establishment
Clause. "'

Orthodox Jews have engaged in a campaign to station
menorot wherever official government authority inheres. To
date, this has resulted in numerous cases including one Supreme

Court decision 2 , in addition to Pinette, and several from United
States Courts of Appeals."'
In one case, Grossbaum v.
it] Their efforts are not limited to placing religious
symbols on public

property. Orthodox Jews are in the forefront of the battle to get public school
teachers into religious schools and to overturn established First Amendment
precedents that barred the way. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997
(1997). The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, an
Orthodox group, took an active part in urging the Supreme Court action. See
Linda Greenhouse, Court to Consider Reversing Decision on ParochialAid,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at A12.
112 Allegheny County v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
1
See, e.g., ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 117
S.Ct. 2434 (1997); Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 1822 (1997); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County.
Bldg. Authority, 100 F.3d 1287 (7th Cir. 1996); American Jewish Congress v.
Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Separation of Church &
State v. Eugene, 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (banning cross and menorah on
public property); Kaplan v. Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 110 S.Ct. 2619 (1990) (stating that "semi-permanent display" of
unattended menorah in City Hall Park violates Establishment Clause); ChabadLubavitch v. Burlington, 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (placing a menorah next
to secular holiday display in public park does not succeed in making the entire
display secular); Congregation Lubavitch v. Cincinnati, 923 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that the city's motion to enjoin menorah from a public forum is
unlikely to succeed on the merits); Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of
Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990) (permitting Christmas tree at O'Hare
Airport but not menorah is not discriminatory because tree is not religious and
menorah is). But see Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State v.
Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1553 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding the display of a
privately funded menorah in the public square with municipal permission is no
violation of Establishment Clause); Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383
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Indianapolis-MarionCounty Building Authority,"4 Orthodox Jews
went so far as to litigate the claim that the ban of all private
displays from the lobby of a government building was retaliation
against Orthodox Jews in violation of their First Amendment
Rights.
At the urging of the Jewish Community Relations
Council and the American Civil Liberties Union, the argument
was rejected.
Even if the motive of the campaign to set up Jewish holy
vessels in public places is to match Christian ones, the notion is
still ill-conceived.' 5
In Lynch v. Donnelly,"6 the Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the City of Pawtucket,
Rhode Island, from erecting a creche celebrating the birth of
Christ because set among reindeer and other allegedly nonreligious objects, the nativity depiction did not convert a secular
scene into a religious display. Moreover, said the majority, the
birth of Jesus Christ was an historical event not a religious
exercise. I suggest that the decision is absurd and deleterious to
both Jews and Christians. The comments on this opinion"7 unite
(11th Cir. 1993) (asserting the menorah in Georgia capitol rotunda does not
violate the Establishment Clause because the rotunda is a public forum).
114 100 F.3d 1287
(7th Cir. 1996).
115 At the very least, it gets courts into the business
of determining which
symbols advanced by different, and competing, religions are "religious" and
which are not. As stated elsewhere in this article, this is not a competition
healthy for a society which constitutionally mandates a separation of church
and state. See, e.g., Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting contentions of Lubavitch Chabad House that the
Christmas tree is "religious" as "frivolous," while the menorah was termed

"religious," and therefore the denial of a permit to erect it next to the
Christmas tree at O'Hare Airport was upheld against the Orthodox Jews' claim
of discrimination).
116 465 U.S.
668 (1984).
117
Professor Norman Redlich, then Dean of New York University Law
School, commented on the op-ed page of the New York Times that the ruling
was an insult to Jews requiring them to accommodate to the majoritarian

religion. Norman Redlich, Before Putting up that Creche or Menorah, N.Y.
TIMES,

July 24, 1989, at A49. This prompted a response from Professor John

Hart Ely, then Dean of Stanford Law School, that the Chief Justice of the
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to keep public property free of religious vessels. Lubavitcher
Jews have rejected this suggestion not only on the ground that
their menorot are stationed on public ground at their own
expense, which is not always true,"' but that they actively sought
government endorsement for reasons which baffle and pain this
author to no end. Attempts to explore their reasoning have
produced little more than suspicion that separation of religion and
state is itself the enemy, and that the Lubavitcher Jews will not
have "arrived" in the United States until the government itself has
recognized and supported their version of Orthodox Judaism.
In Philadelphia, for example, the Lubavitchers installed
what they claimed was "the world's largest menorah""' 9 adjacent
to the Liberty Bell, and Rabbi Abraham Shemtov was hoisted by
a "cherry picker" crane provided at government expense to light
the Hanukkah candles. This came to light in October 1979 when
the American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter "ACLU"]
brought suit in federal court against the City of Philadelphia for
violation of the Establishment Clause by building a platform for
Pope John Paul II to conduct a mass. 12 Critics let loose with a
flood of anti-Semitic comments and threats asserting that ACLU
was anti-Catholic and looked the other way when Jews were the
beneficiaries.

United States in his opinion for the Court insulted Christians by telling them
that their most sacred religious symbol was like plastic reindeers and candy
canes.
118 See, e.g., Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997); ACLU
v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir. 1997).
119 The claim is still being made.
See JEWISH EXPONENT, Nov. 28, 1996,
Col.4-5.
120 Gilfillan v. Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 934 (3d
Cir. 19SO). The United
States District Court held the City in violation and the Court of Appeals
affirmed by a vote of 2-1. Id. Judge Aldisert dissented on the grounds that
the Vatican, like the State of Israel, was a theocratic state and the Pope as head
of state was a political figure and any aid extended to him was perforce not
religious. Id. at 935 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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ACLU responded that suit would be brought against2
1
Philadelphia unless municipal funding ceased for the menorah.
Rabbi Shemtov sought to distinguish the cases of the menorah and
the platform on the ground that Hanukkah was not a religious
holiday and the menorah is not a religious symbol. This
comment prompted the question, "Would you like a federal judge
to decide whether a Jewish holiday and which of the holy vessels
is religious?' 22 The city backed down only the day before
Hanukkah and entered into an agreement not to support the
ceremony.
But city support continued that year" ' and the next,
the municipal administration claiming oversight.
Subsequently, in 1992, the Lubavitchers could not resist the
temptation for official endorsement, and Edward Rendell, the
first Jewish mayor of Philadelphia, accepted the invitation of this
Orthodox Jewish sect to participate in the Hanukkah candle
lighting ceremony in his official capacity as chief executive of the
City. Wearing a yarmulke, Mayor Rendell was hoisted by the
crane, now privately funded, together with the rabbi to light the
Hanukkah candles and recite the blessings in Hebrew together
with the assembled congregation. Denying any violation of the

The author was General Counsel for ACLU and was personally acquainted
with the facts recited here. See also Civil Liberties Record, 30 ACLU of
Pennsylvania 1 (1980), and letters from the City Solicitor of Philadelphia to
Burton Caine reproduced there.
122
Rabbi Shemtov was following good Christian tradition. In Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), Protestant ministers testified
that the Bible was not religious in an attempt to defend Bible reading against a
First Amendment claim that the practice violated the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 210. And when it served their purpose to assert that Quetzalcoatl, the
ancient Aztec serpent god, was religious for the purpose of trying to enjoin a
municipality from placing a sculpture of a deity in the park, Christian
fundamentalists did so. Unsuccessfully! See Alvardo v. City of San Jose, 94
F.3d 1223 (9thCir. 1996).
121

123

Civil Liberties Record, supra note 121.

Id. Rabbi Shemtov defended that the blessings were recited by a 5-year
old boy and that did not count because he was not yet a bar-mitzvah. Id.
124
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agreement or the First Amendment,U and justifying his actions,
Mayor Rendell wrote to me and the ACLU:
I accepted an invitation from the Lubavitch House to
participate it its Menorah lighting ceremony ... to
recognize the cultural diversity of our population, and6 to
join groups of citizens in celebrating their traditions.1
And the Mayor in his official capacity and so identified by
the seal of the City of Philadelphia, continued the practice of
participating in the Hanukkah candle lighting ceremony.I2
Despite the Mayor's claim, I suggest that the facts point to
"endorsement" of Hanukkah. In my view, several decisions
confirm that view, most pointedly the court which sits across
from Independence Square in full view of the menorah and
Hanukkah candle-lighting ceremony. In Schundler, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit condemned Jersey City's display of
both a creche and menorah on the ground that when the
government itself is involved, "endorsement" is either present by
definition, or the inevitable conclusion of any reasonable
observer.12 Only the astounding 2-1 decision of the Court of
29
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Elewski v. City of Syracuse,'
casts any doubt on this conclusion. Not only is the message that
it is good to be religious, but even a particular religion is
125 A

similar claim was made in Doe v. Crestwood, 917 F.2d 1476-78
(7th
Cir. 1990). The court held that the municipality's sponsorship of a Roman
Catholic mass spoken in Italian as part of an Italian festival violates the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 1479. Judge Easterbrook cited ACLU for the
proposition that "even a herd of reindeer and a forest of jumbo candy canes
could not neuter a mass - a religious observance that does substantially more
than mark the birth of a figure with religious significance. [Miass ... is an
occasion for worship, not for putting a holiday in a historical context that
happens to be religious." Id. at 1479. The same can be said for lighting
Hanukkah candles with the prescribed blessings.
126 Letter from Edward Rendell, Mayor, Philadelphia to Burton Caine (Feb.
10, 1993).
127 See JEWISH EXPONENT, Dec. 17, 1993,
at 9 (photo reprint 1993).
128 104 F.3d 1435 (3d Cir. 1997).
129 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1967).
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preferred. In Elewski, the Court decided that a municipality
could erect a creche where Jews installed a menorah.'30 And the
fact that the municipal government financed the creche totally and
only partially funded the menorah was not enough to prove either
endorsement of both religions, or discrimination in favor of
Christians. Either would transgress the Establishment Clause."'
What neither of these cases had to deal with was the
Mayor of the City under the official seal of government
participating together with rabbis in a religious ceremony. Those
facts alone should brand the ceremony a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Mayor Rendell, while denying any violation of the
Establishment Clause, seems to have changed his practice and
now only32witnesses the candle-lighting ceremony as an official
observer.1
The whole enterprise is a parade example of what not to
do in a Constitutional system designed to keep the government
out of the nasty business of tempting religious strife.' In the
words of Justice Souter, "Constitutional lines are the price of
constitutional government."'4 And for Jews to be active in
breaching the wall of separation of religion and state is to invite
the evils which so stained the Jewish experience in Europe.
In Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Orthodox Jews
entered into what I view as an "unholy alliance" with Christians
30
131

132

Id. at 54.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).

Having recently assisted publicly in raising substantial funds for Catholic

parochial schools ignoring ACLU objection, the Mayor apparently has made
the decision that he was sufficiently fortified to cater to the Jewish vote. One

wonders whether playing politics with religion will gain the mayor (and the
Jews) approbation from Christians- including those who support using

taxpayers' funds for the papal mass. Or, whether the Mayor, together with the
Lubavitchers will be seen to have worked in concert to engender precisely the

"political divisiveness" sought to be avoided by the First Amendment
Establishment Clause.
133 See
134

Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).

Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2026 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to make a shambles of the separation principle. The grim tale is
told - in part - in Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties

Union.135 Catholics had installed a creche in the interior of the
county136courthouse, without any accompanying reindeer or candy
canes.
A block away, in front of the City-County Building,
Christians set up a Christmas tree and Jews placed a Hanukkah
menorah and
between them was a sign reading, "A Salute to
37
,1
Liberty.
ACLU sued to enjoin the entire display as a violation of
the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court granted relief as
to the creche because there was no dilution of the religious motif
thus distinguishing Lynch v. Donnelly.'39 But the Christmas Tree/
Hanukkah menorah display was permitted on the ground that two
religious symbols were less than the sum of their parts because
a message of diversity, a theme confirmed by
they communicated
4
the sign.
If the story ended here, one might be tempted to applaud
the Jewish strategy because the Jews achieved parity with the
majority. And credit for shrewdness, as well, since one could
fear that a gentile court could consider the menorah "religious",
Rabbi Shemtov notwithstanding, and yet let a Christmas tree pass
as friendly fir. Indeed, some justices said exactly that. But the
majority was duped into believing that the religious coalition was
a celebration of the "winter holiday season." t 4'
Allegheny County followed the script and interdicted the
menorah. 42 Then the Lubavitchers sued claiming that ACLU held
that the Hanukkah menorah was constitutionally kosher and was
135 492
136 Id.

U.S. 573 (1989).
at 580.

137 Id.

at 581-82.
139Id. at
587-88.
139Id. at 588 (distinguishing from Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
140Id. at
615.
141 Id.
142

at 616.

See Pennsylvania County Rejects Displaying of Nativity Scene, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, at A36.
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met with the defense that only when it was twinned with a
Christian religious symbol and not otherwise.' 3 In other words,
the majority held the right of veto over the Jewish candelabra.
The issue was never decided by the Supreme Court'" and is
probably now swept up in the Pinette case, where the majority
seems likely to approve virtually any 4 religious symbol, free
M
standing or otherwise, in a public forum.
Orthodox Jews seem energized by their appetite to obtain

not only state support for their religious practices, but privilege
46
as well. How else can one explain in the Kiryas Joel litigation,
the passion to get the legislature of New York State to
gerrymander a special school district for the benefit this sect of
Satmer Jews alone among the 1600 school districts in the state.
As said elsewhere in this article, the New York Times, in an
unusual editorial, has pleaded with the Jews "to stop fighting the
First Amendment." 47
And, as seen above, the menorah campaign seems driven
by missionary zeal. So much so that the American Jewish
Congress brought suit in California to prevent the erection of a
menorah near City Hall - unattended - for a period of two weeks
143Allegheny,

492 U.S. at 586.
I" Chabad v. Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Justice Brennan
allowed the
menorah in this instance and the motion of the City of Pittsburgh to vacate the
order was denied without opinion and with several dissents. Id. at 620.
Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and Scalia dissented. Id. at 621 (Rehnquist,
Stevens & Scalia, JJ., dissenting).

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 755-62
(1995). Four Justices expressed the view that any private expression in a
public forum was per se constitutional, not in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 753. Other Justices reserved the right to hold that under certain
circumstances private speech in a public forum could create the impression that
the government endorsed the message. Id. at 756. One wonders what these
Justices could have had in mind- that the Establishment Clause would only bar
the city if it permitted Christians to turn on the interior lights of City Hall to
form a giant cross at Christmas, and allowed Jews to likewise light it up in the
form of a menorah at Hanukkah.
145

146

See infra note 205 and accompanying text.

147 See

infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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around Hanukkah - where the city denied applications for a
winter solstice display and a Latin cross. The Court of Appeal
for the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, citing Pinette, enjoined the
menorah on the ground that, "[t] he Establishment Clause bars the
government from giving sectarian religious groups preferential
access to public property."' 4 s Religious wars have been ignited
elsewhere with less provocation.
Perhaps, when it comes to erecting religious symbols on
public property, the issue of the eruv is the misadventure of
Orthodox Jews most fraught with danger of creating "political
fragmentation and division along religious lines, one of the
principal evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to protect."'49
In the only two American cases 1' on the subject which
research has revealed, Smith v. Community Board"', and
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Long "
52, trial
courts have upheld the constitutionality of the eruv. In the
federal court opinion, the more substantive of the two cases, the
Court described the emv as follows:
An emv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken delineation
of an area. The demarcation of the eruv boundary is
primarily created using existing telephone poles and
fences with wires connecting them with small halfrounds attached to sides of poles. The designation of an
eruv allows observant Jews to carry or push objects from
148

American Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 90 F.3d 379 (9th Cir.

1996) (en banc).
49 Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
150 Calvin Trillin, Drawing the Line, NEV
YORKER, Dec. 12, 1994, at 50. A
bitter dispute in London with overtones of virulent anti-Semitism is described.
The article is not irrelevant to the theme of this section that pushing a religious
agenda is bound to cause political divisiveness along religious lines. The
difference, of course, between England and the United States, is that there is
no Constitutional barrier between church and state in Great Britain so there can
be no danger of eroding any wall of separation. Id.
151 128 Misc.2d 944, 491 N.Y.S.2d
584 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1985).
152 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987).
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place to place within the area during the Sabbath.
Within the eruv observant Jews may push baby carriages
from their homes to the synagogue or to other homes,
carry books to the synagogue, and carry food to one
another's homes.'53
The City of Long Branch adopted a resolution authorizing
the creation of the eruv using existing telephone poles on public
property and additional poles and fences which the City
authorized the synagogue to erect.'m ACLU and one Deborah
Jacoby sued to prevent the erection of the eruv, asserting that it
constituted a permanent religious symbol on public property in
violation of the Establishment Clause.' 55 The Court in rejecting
the suit, accepted the claim of Orthodox Jews that the eruv is not
a religious symbol.'5 6 Accordingly, the court in applying the test
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'" decided that both the government's
motive and the effect of the legislation were secular because "the
eruv merely permits [observant Jews] to participate in such
secular activities as pushing a stroller or carrying a book while
observing the Sabbath."'M Nor did the court find excessive
entanglement between religion and state, the third prong of
Lemon, because after the initial meetings and "some disputes
within the community, the court sees no indication that the
will cause the kind of continuing political
existence of the eruv ...

divisiveness within the community anticipated by the Supreme
Court in Lemon."'59
The court distinguished the 1981 ruling of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gilfillan v. Philadelphia,'60which
153 Id.
154

Id.

155

Id.

156

at 1294.

Id.

Id. at 1295.

403 U.S. 602 (1971). See text accompanying notes 76-79.
158 City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. at 1296.
157

159

Id. at 1297.

1606

37 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980).
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held that the City of Philadelphia violated the Establishment
Clause by constructing a platform and cross for the Pope to say
mass. 1 The eruv, said the Court in Long Branch, unlike the
cross and the platform, were neither religious symbols nor used
in a religious ceremony.
The eruv decision, I submit, is shaky on virtually every
ground of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and ought to fail
all three prongs of the Lemon v. Kurtzman'6 analysis.

The

government's purpose was surely to relieve Orthodox Jews of one
of the traditional burdens imposed by halaha, Jewish religious
law, the prohibition against transporting or carrying on the Jewish
sabbath. No other religion was benefited thereby and that alone
should run afoul of Justice Black's admonition in full in Everson
v. Board of Education,'6 "[a state cannot] pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another."'6 The case is clearly analogous to Barghout v. Bureau
of Kosher Meats and Food Control, Wwhere the United States
Court of Appeals in 1995 held that a Baltimore ordinance
prohibiting the labeling of food as "kosher" unless approved by
Orthodox Jews violated the Establishment Clause.'6 1 Two
concurring judges added that it favored Jews over non-Jews.' 67
For the same reason, the effect was to advance the Jewish
religion by lending the state's assistance to observant Jews to
comply with Jewish law in obeying their most sacred holy day.
And with respect to entanglement of government with
religion in the sense of political divisiveness along religious lines,
the federal court virtually proves the point by favoring the Jews
with their eruv as against the Catholics with their cross.

161

Id. at 933.

162

Id. at 929.

163

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

164

Id. at 15.

165

66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995).

166

Id. at 1346.

167

Id. at 1349 (Luttig and Wilkins, JJ., concurring).
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Clearly, the district court seemed ready to gamble that the
Supreme Court has all but abandoned Lemon v. Kurtzman' and
has substituted "accommodation" of religion as the new talisman
in the area of public support of religious practices. As long as
the City of Long Branch has not "refused to accommodate other
religious groups," declared the Court, "permitting the eruv is an
acceptable accommodation and does not improperly advance
religion."'69 This language adopts the popular misconception that
if all religions are supported equally, there is no violation of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment. This confuses the
Fourteenth Amendment bar against discrimination with the First
Amendment mandate of separation of Church and State. It
echoes the erroneous sentiments expressed in the prior New York
case. 7 0 If the government were to pay for the construction of
every church, synagogue, mosque, and other houses of worship,
together with the salaries of all priests, rabbis, and other religious
personnel, and the expenses of religious education and worship,
that would pass the test of no discrimination among religions, but
would surely violate the separation of religion and state ordained
by the Establishment Clause.
The questions that Jews should ask are whether they want
a court to tell them whether vessels essential to religious practice,
and even their holidays themselves, are "religious"? Do Jews
want to declare their effects "secular" in order to escape the
consequences of the Establishment Clause? Orthodox Jews did as
much in attempting to place their Hanukkah menorah next to
signs in a park in Vermont reading "Seasons's Greetings," "An
168

Four Justices have urged that the Lemon test should be discarded. See Lee

v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603-04 (1992). Justice Blackmun noted in his
concurring opinion, that the majority in proscribing school prayer did not even
mention Lemon. But in the recent Supreme Court decision of Agostini v.
Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997), Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, cites
Lemon v. Kurtzman for the factors the Court uses to determine violations of
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2000.
169 City of Long Branch, 670
F.Supp. at 1296.
170 Smith v. Community Bd., 128 Misc.2d 944, 946, 491
N.Y.S.2d 584, 586
(1984).
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American Salute to Liberty," "Peace on Earth," and "Happy
Holidays," but the court saw through the effort, declared the
menorah "religious," and banned it as a violation of the

Establishment Clause. 7' The Jews in the eruv case have played
the high stakes game adumbrated by Rabbi Shemtov's
asseveration to me that Hanukkah is not a "religious" holiday" in

order to circumvent the First Amendment prohibition on
municipal financing of a menorah at the Liberty Bell in

Philadelphia. And one should not forget that when Protestant
clergy testified in Abington v. Schempp'73 that the Bible itself is
not "religious" in order to escape the Establishment Clause
proscription of Bible reading in public schools, the Supreme
Court unanimously rejected the thesis. With similar purpose,
Christians contended in Stone v. GrahamM that the Ten
Commandments were moral or ethical, and not "religious." That
effort failed, but in Lynch v. Donnelly'75 the dominant Christian
community had little difficulty in convincing a court - seemingly
eager to sacrifice the Establishment Clause on the altar of
"accommodation" - that a creche in a Christmas celebration with
plastic reindeers was not "religious." And in Allegheny County v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 17' a confused Court was
persuaded that pairing a Christian symbol with a Jewish one for
the purpose of evading the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause will succeed either by itself, or if the word "liberty" is
injected in the display. Indeed, said the Court, both symbols
somehow lose their religious character.
The lesson Jews should have learned is that minorities run
the risk when they seek Constitutional exemption for themselves
from the strictures of the religion clauses that they succeed only
171

Chabad-Lubavitch of Vermont v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d
109 (2d

Cir. 1991).
172 See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
17 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
174 449 U.S.
39 (1980).
175

465 U.S. 668 (1984).

176 492

U.S. 573 (1989).
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in obtaining an exemption for majoritarian religions at the
expense of minority sects. That majoritarian religions are entitled
to "accommodation" by minorities, the necessary predicate of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,1 is a
frightening enough idea which turns on its head the Bill of Rights
Alexis de
whose purpose is to protect minorities from what
7
,
majority."
the
of
"tyranny
the
termed
Tocqueville
For Jews to bait the lion is sheer folly. Asking the court
to adjudicate that a cross is "religious" and an eruv is not, is
asking for trouble. The Christian right, for one, will mount a
new crusade, never forgetting the sting of defeat at the hands of
Long Branch 7 9
the Jews. Temporary victory in a district court in
must be measured against ultimate defeat in the Supreme Court in
Pinnette where the menorah and the KKK cross were held to be
constitutional equivalents.'so
The lesson in society at large is even more scary. Not
only are Jews doing precisely what Lemon warns against, namely,
dividing the community along religious lines, but also
surrendering the right to define themselves and their religion.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in an 1818 decision showed that
it was no Sanhedrin when it declared that the Talmud did not
require Jews to work six days a week as mandated in the Fourth
Commandment, Exodus, 20:9; 34:21."' Thus, the Court upheld

the conviction of an Orthodox Jew for performing "worldly
employment or business on the Lord's day, commonly called
Sunday."
The whole experience, I reiterate, cannot be good for the
Jews! In my view, it is certainly not good for the United States,

177
178

465 U.S. 668 (1994).
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY

IN

AMERICA 263 (Colonial ed. 1900).

179

ACLU v. City of Long Beach, 670 F.Supp. 1293 (D.N.J.
1987).

180

See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.

Commonwealth v. Wolf, III Sergeant and Rawles' Reps.48 (S.Ct. Pa.
1817).
181
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unique in the world, so far as I know, in erecting a wall of
separation between religion and state.
2. Public Funds for Religious Schools
Repeating, in part, what was said at the beginning of this
Section B," in 1947, in Everson v. Board of Education, ' the
United States Supreme Court said:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: ... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. "
When I was President of Solomon Schechter Day School
in Philadelphia in the 1960's, I wrote to the Governor of
Pennsylvania on behalf of Schechter urging him to veto any bill
the legislature would pass granting aid to religious schools.
I said that although the financial plight of the school
bordered on the desperate, making a shambles of the First
Amendment was too high a price to pay even for the survival of
our school. If the institution was unable to attract the financial
support it deserved from Jews, it may be doomed to pass away.
But to force others to support Jewish education with their tax
funds would not only violate the Establishment Clause of the First

182Justice Aharon Barak, now President of the Supreme Court
of Israel,

conveyed to this author his reaction to the American scene in the nation's

capital that although the First Amendment mandates separation of religion and
state there is a Christmas tree and creche on one side of the White House and a
Hanukkah menorah on the other and on the currency it states, 'In God We
Trust." What could the First Amendment mean, he inquired? Justice Barak

could have cited other illustrations.
193 See supranote 85 and
accompanying text.
184 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
185

- -
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Amendment, but in the words of Thomas Jefferson, would be
"sinful and tyrannical" as well."'

The difference between Orthodox and liberal Jews is stark
when it comes to the whether tax funds may be used to finance
religious schools. Support for funding has been spearheaded by
the Catholic Church, now aided by fundamentalist Christian sects
and, unfortunately, Orthodox Jews.'" Opponents include an array
of civil liberties organizations including those associated with
Jewish groups." Whether Orthodox support is based simply on
the desire to get the money, or whether it stands on Constitutional
principle is a subject of intense debate.
The current struggle for massive public funding for
religious schools is one of the most dangerous assaults on the
separation principle because, to paraphrase Cardozo's famous
rhetoric, "Money invites contention!" 8 9 Cleverly misnamed
"choice" legislation by its advocates because it allegedly gives
parents a choice to send their children to religious schools, the
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). Thomas Jefferson's
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, enacted by Virginia in 1785 declares:
"[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical." Id.
IV Agostini v. Felton, 117 U.S. 1997 (1997). Orthodox Jews
were in the
forefront of the successful effort to get the U.S. Supreme Court to overrule
two pillars of the wall of separation of church and state which barred the
government from placing public school teachers in private religious schools.
Id.
188 An advertisement placed by the Anti-Defamation
League in The New York
Times, on October 25, 1995, contains the following statement to which the
"liberal" Jewish groups could subscribe:
Our nation's founders had the wisdom to build into the First
Amendment to our Constitution the separation of church and state,
which has guaranteed religious freedom to all our citizens for more
than 200 years. The First Amendment was an inspired act of
revolutionary genius by Jefferson, Madison, Adams and all those
who helped produce a concept of freedom unparalleled in the history
of the world.
Id.
189
Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). Justice
Cardozo warns: "Danger invites rescue!" Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437.
186
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word is intentionally misleading because early in the century, the
Supreme Court held in Piercev. Society of Sisters' that the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion protected the right
to attend private religious schools. But that right does not mean
that the government must pay for religious education, any more
than the right to pray requires the state to build a house of

worship!
This author is squarely in favor of no public funds or
support for religion, based primarily upon the First Amendment
which has served the nation so well.' 9' Religion has thrived in the
United States because people have chosen to subscribe to it
voluntarily, not because of government pressure or support. '9
And, it has been good for the Jews! Tuition vouchers would be an
irreparable breach in the wall of separation between church and
state and have been so found in lower court cases in various
states. 9 The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
issue.1 3
The essential point of the separation principle, often
missed by its detractors, is that it is not a denigration of religion.
To the contrary, it elevates religion by providing that government
may neither help nor hinder, so that religion, or a particular
religion, will prosper or not by the quality of its ideas, not the
190 268
191

U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
On October 29, 1991, I testified before the Education Committee of the

Pennsylvania House of Representatives in Harrisburg, that House Bill 1133
providing for tuition vouchers for religious schools was unconstitutional in
violation of the First Amendment separation of church and state. Accepting
this position, the House decided not to vote on the bill - already passed by the
Pennsylvania Senate - and the legislation failed.
19 See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct.
at 197214 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1992)) (noting the effect that a negative
bar against establishment of religion implies affirmative establishment of
secular public order).
19- See Doerr, Menedez, & Swomley, The Case Against
School Vouchers
AMERICANS FOR RELIGIOUS LmERTY (Silver Spring, Md 1995). See also cases

cited in Voice of Reason, 60:2 The Newsletter of Americans for Religious
Liberty 9 (1997).
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force of the public fisc. James Madison wrote in his famous
1785 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
in Virginia:
[Ilt is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties.... Who does not see.. .that the same authority
which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only
of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?'9
Destroying the wall of separation of church and state by
public funding of religious education destroys a protection for
Jews because Christians would get the bulk of the funds and see
little reason to give Jews any substantial amounts unless Jewish
help would still be needed to insure continued funding for
Christians. In any contest for funds, I cannot imagine that
majoritarian legislators would be expected to view Jewish
religious education with the same sympathy expectable for more
popular doctrine. The Pittsburgh experience referred to above is
instructive.
Moreover, if financial support flows from government to
religious schools, what will surely follow is governmental
regulation of the use of the money, a clear danger to the
independence of the schools. This is another reason why the
whole scheme engenders an excessive entanglement between
religion and government in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 19'Polarization along religious lines in the competition for

public money and support was a risk the authors of the First
Amendment sought to avoid. ' 9
It is not the purpose of this article to review the long and
tortuous career of the Supreme Court in deciding when and
whether financial aid to religious schools violates the
194
19
196

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 41 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 636 (1975).
See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1945); Sloan v. Lemon,

415 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1973).
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Establishment Clause. From Everson v. Board of Education, the
modem Court's first decision on the subject, which held by a 5-4
decision that the state may consistent with the Establishment
Clause pay to bus children to and from parochial school, 197 to
Agostini v. Felton, its most recent pronouncement on state aid to
religious education, where the Court, again by a 5-4 decision,
overruled long-standing cases barring the government from
sending public school teachers to teach in parochial schools, "3
controversy over the half century has been a constant companion.
For the reasons stated in this article, this author has opposed all
state aid to religion, and most forcefully to religious education
no matter what the denomination. Justice Wiley Rutledge, a
Catholic, in his profound dissent in Everson, viewed financial
support for parochial schools as deleterious to the principle of the
separation of church and state as subsidizing the church itself.t99
It is not unexpected that parochial schools seek money
from the government. I believe with Thomas Jefferson that to
yield to such demands is sinful and tyrannical, in addition to
being interdicted by the First Amendment. The thesis of this
article is that is also bad for the Jews. Far from being opposed to
religious school - all of my children attended for their entire preuniversity education and I was also President of a Hebrew Day
School - I have concluded that whether or not state aid would be
beneficial, it is too high a price to pay for the devastation of the
First Amendment. My Orthodox co-religionists have been so
fanatic in their pursuit of taxpayers funds for their religious
schools that, in my view they are bent on Constitutional
destruction on a scale so vast that I fear that all Jews will suffer.
The current illustration is the zeal with which Orthodox
Jews have thrown their weight behind the effort to have the
Supreme Court puncture the dike holding back the flood waters of
zoo
aid to parochial schools. In two 1985 cases, Aguilar v. Felton
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
198 117 S.Ct.
1997 (1997).
199 330 U.S.
at 57-58.
197

200

473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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and School District Of Grand Rapids v. Ball,'O the Court barred
the government from sending public school teachers into sectarian
schools to provide remedial instruction, which thus had to be
administered outside. As Justice Brennan constantly reminded,
the lesson to be learned was that separation of church and state
was the essential doctrine of our Constitution."' Twelve years
later, without a new trial, or another controversy, and under a
rule permitting the Court to reconsider cases upon newly
discovered evidence or changed circumstances, five Justices were
persuaded to change the direction of the Court and to reverse the
two landmark decisions. The ground cited was that with the
change in the composition of the Court, subsequent cases showed
that the court had changed its mind on aid to parochial schools.
There were four vigorous dissents among which was Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg who dissented also on the ground that the use of
the rule on changed circumstances was illegitimate and had never
before used to re-decide precedents because of new appointments
to the Court. ' °3 The National Jewish Commission on Law and
Public Affairs, an Orthodox group, took an active part in urging
the Supreme Court action.204

3. Gerrymandering School Districts
Another recent misadventure of Orthodox Jews in
attempts to level the wall of separation of religion and state is told
in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet05 and its
aftermath. The Satmar Hasidim sect of Orthodox Jews prevailed
upon the legislature of New York to gerrymander a school district
just for them in which they could educate their handicapped
children in secular studies without contact with others. The
201

473 U.S. 373 (1985).

202

Id. at 374.

203

Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,
2026.

204

See Linda Greenhouse, Court to ConsiderReversing Decision on Parochial

Aid, N.Y. TimES, Jan. 18, 1997, at A12.
205 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
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Satmars preferred complete isolation but could not, or would not
bear the cost of such an expensive enterprise.2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed lower courts in
holding the entire scheme a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Before the ink was dry on the decision, the Hasidic sect
persuaded the New York legislature to circumvent the high court
ruling. But the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court condemned the new legislation as "subterfuge" whose
specific demographic criteria were tailored to benefit only the
Hasidic village of Kiryas Joel among the state's 1600
municipalities.x) Quoting from the United States Supreme Court
ruling, the New York court said, "the current law is exposed as a
subterfuge and, as with the prior law, legislation 'singl[ing] out a
particular religious group for favorable treatment."'"
In the words of Louis Grumet, Executive Director of the
New York State School Boards Association, "The Legislature
chose to dress the wolf up in sheep's clothing and say it's a
sheep, but the court said it's a wolf."' '
The New York State Court of Appeals, the highest court
in the state, affirmed with a ringing denunciation of the legislative
rehash which retains "the non-neutral effect of allowing the
religious community of Kiryas Joel, but no other group at this
time and probably ever, to create its own school district.""
There were clear overtones of religious tyranny even within the sect. See
Evelyn Nieves, A Village Faces Another Kind of Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14,
1996, at A27. See also Dissidents Gain With Kiryas Joel Pact, Settlement is
Reached Hours Before Testimony by Grand Rabbi, N.Y. TIMES, March 12,
1997, at B6 (noting that Kiryas Joel paid dissidents $300,000 and permitted
them to reopen their synagogue to avoid having the Kiryas Joel leader, Rabbi
Teiltlebaum, testify on the subject of discrimination against the dissidents).
207 Grumet v. Cuomo, 225 A.D.2d 4, 12, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565, 570 (3d Dep't
1996).
206

208

209

Id. (quoting Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)).

School District of Kiryas Joel is Ruled Illegal, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26,

1996, at B1.
Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 69, 681 N.E.2d 340, 345, 659
N.Y.S.2d 173, 178 (1997).
210
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This, the New York court proclaimed, unconstitutionally
"endorses the Satmar community of Kiryas Joel" in violation of
the First Amendment separation of religion and state.2"
But the Satmars did not stop. On August 4, 1997, the
New York State legislature passed another bill to create a special,
religiously segregated public school district for the Satmar
Hasidic sect in Kiryas Joel. Louis Grumet, reacted, "New
York's leaders should be ashamed of themselves because they
know this is wrong." 2
The American Jewish Congress was among those who
challenged the revised statute and should be congratulated for
fidelity to Constitutional principles in the face of violation by
fellow Jews.
The Satmars would be well advised to take the advice of The
New York Times editorial, "It is time for the leaders of both the
state and the village to stop fighting the First Amendment. 213 The
campaign for special privilege on behalf of an aggressive and
influential religious sect smacks of monomania in a area of
extreme sensitivity - the separation of religion and government -

creating a precedent as dangerous as lighting a fuse in a
munitions factory!2

211
212

Id.

See 60:2 VOICE OF REASON, THE NEWSLETER OF AMERICANS FOR

RELIGIOUS LMERTY 9 (1997).
213 Time to Stop the Kiryas Joel Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996, at A20.
214 Kiryas Joel violations of the principle of the separation of church and state,
here "synagogue and state," have extended into using a synagogue as a poling
place. See Poling Must Move From Hasidic Synagogue, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2,
1997 at a38. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld an order by District Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr., that the
synagogue social hall "was fundamentally unsuited" as a polling place. Id.
The Court rejected as Constitutionally immaterial the claim of the Orthodox
Jews that Satmar women and other devout Hasidim are prohibited by their
religion to enter a public school to vote because men and women co-mingle
there.
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4. School prayer
If there is anything in the religion area that should
immediately recommend itself to Jews of all denominations for
rejection and disqualification, it is school prayer. To borrow a
phrase from the Haggadah, prayer in public schools has so
"embittered" the lives of Jews that by now they should have
conditioned their instincts to oppose it. Rarely, do I encounter
the subject in or out of the classroom without recollections of the
pain inflicted on Jews by Christian prayer or ceremony. My own
memories in elementary school of the New Testament drumbeat
excoriation of "the hypocrites in the synagogues" 211 retain their

shrill vividness. After all, the prayer ritual is bound to be
Christian, the most common majoritarian exercise.
The Pennsylvania statute, for example, invalidated in
Abington School District v. Schempp216 provided: "At least ten
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at

the opening of each public school on each school day," 217 and the
practice also included "the recitation of the Lord's Prayer ... by
the students ... in unison." 2t8 The "Lord," of course, refers not to
the God of the Hebrew Bible, but to Jesus. 2"9 Nor should it be

expected that the majority religion would mandate prayer of any
other sect.
The first school prayer case to reach the Supreme Court
was Engel v. Vitalen in 1962. There, the New York Board of
Regents composed a "non-denominational" prayer which read,
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
215
216

Mathew 6:2-5.
374 U.S. 203 (1963).

217

Id. at 205.

218

Id. at 207.

219

Luke 11:1-4; Matthew, 6:9 -13.

DICTIONARY, Vol.4:357 (Doubleday
THE BmtFL 154 (Abingdon
220 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

See also THE ANCHOR BmLE

1992); 3 INTERPRETER'S DICTIONARY

OF

Press 1962).
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we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country.
By a 6-1 decision, the Court declared the prayer "a
religious activity" and "wholly inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause."' '
The decision proclaimed that the
Establishment Clause "must at least mean that [it] is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as part of a religious
program carried on by the government. ,23 Nor did the fact that
recitation of the prayer was voluntary excuse the transgression.
Since the prayer was instituted by the New York Board of
Regents, it is not unlikely that Jews were involved in the decision
to create the prayer. If so, one wonders whether this was their
rear guard action to ward off a hostile "sectarian" prayer of the
dominant church. Since this was pre-Abington v. Schempp, one
could not be confident then that the Supreme Court would hold
that even Christian prayer ritual would violate the Establishment
Clause. Or, if musing is in order, the opposite possibility
suggests that this was the surrender to Christianity which could
be relied upon to be invalidated by the United States Supreme
Court.
There is no such speculation about Jewish participation
almost three decades later in 1989 when Rabbi Leslie Gutterman
of Temple Beth El in Providence, Rhode Island, delivered at a
public middle school graduation a "nonsectarian.. .Invocation and
Benediction" prepared in accordance with "Guidelines for Civic
Occasions" of the National Conference of Christians and Jews .2

The Invocation began "God of the Free, Hope of the Brave" and
ended "May our aspirations for our country and for these young
people, who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled." The
Benediction began, "0 God, we are grateful to You ....
" and

ended, "We give thanks to You, Lord ....
" To both, the
programmed response was "AMEN."

222

Id. at 422.
Id. at 424.

223

Id. at 425.

224

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

221
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In Lee v. Weisman , the Supreme Court held these
226
If
"prayers" violated
the Establishment Clause.
This time it does
not appear that this was the work of Orthodox Jews. Yet, the
official reports of the case reveal that conservative religious
groups, including the National Jewish Commission on Law and
Public Affairs, appeared as amici curiae urging that the prayers
be permitted and the American Jewish Congress, and other liberal
defense organizations urged affirmance of the lower court
judgment proscribing such prayers as a violation of the
Establishment Clause. m7 Perhaps, the comment by Justice
Kennedy for the majority that the Guidelines of the National
Conference of Christians and Jews "acknowledge that '[p]rayer of
any kind may be inappropriate on some civic occasions'" was
meant to signal that NCCJ opposed group prayer in public
schools. It may also indicate that the rabbi involved acted
without sanction from any Jewish civil rights interests, or even in
opposition to them.
The fact is that Jewish clergy participated in an act of
religious ceremony clearly inimical to the interests of the Jews.
This is another illustration of how idiosyncratic action by some
Jews will act to the detriment of Jews in general by serving the
cause of the battering ram forces devoted to devastating the wall
of separation of religion and state.
The danger is exacerbated by the perfervid efforts of
fundamentalist groups to get prayer back into the public schools.
They make clear their intention to circumvent the constitutional
barriers erected by Engel-Schempp-Weisman. For example, the
Court in Wallace v. Jaffree229 emphasized that the purpose of the
legislation authorizing setting aside one minute at the beginning
of the school day "for meditation or voluntary prayer" was to

225 Id.
226
227

2
229

(5-4 decision).
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 581.
Id.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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evade Supreme Court decisions in order to return prayer to public
schools .23

The effort is fueled by what is perceived as a loophole in
the Lee v. Weisman decision which would allow student-initiated
group prayer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in American Civil Liberties Union v. Black Horse Pike
Regional Board of Education,23 ' held that school policy allowing
senior class to vote for prayer at high school graduation violates
the Establishment Clause. 21 2 There were four dissents.2 The
Third Circuit rejected the contrary decision of the Fifth Circuit in
2
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District.
5. School Closing on religious holidays
Four recent lower federal cases raise the issue of whether
state mandated closing of public institutions on religious holidays
- all involve Good Friday - violates the Establishment Clause.

The courts divide evenly on the issue. In 2-1 rulings, the circuit
courts and district courts reached opposite results. In 1991, the
233
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cammack v. Waihee,
upheld the Hawaii statute on the theory that the state wanted to
add a holiday and had no religious purpose in choosing Good
Judge D.W. Nelson, in dissent, vigorously
Friday.23
In Metzl v. Leininger,23 Judge Posner for the
disagreed.
Seventh Circuit, held that the Illinois law violated the
230
231

Id. at 59-60.
84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996).

Id. at 1488.
Id. at 1489 (Mansmann, Nygaard, Alito, & Roth, JJ., dissenting).
234 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Ingebretsen v.
Jackson Public
232

233

School Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (distinguish-g, in part, the earlier
Fifth Circuit decision and banned the prayer).
235 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
236 Id. at 776.
237 Id. at 782.
238 57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Establishment Clause. 239 Judge Manion dissented. 20 The district

court decisions likewise disagreed.
S•
241 Specifically, Freedom from
Religion Foundation v. Litscher, followed Metzl and struck
242
243
down a Wisconsin law, and Koenick v. Felton, distinguished
244
Metzl and upheld a Maryland statute.
In both Metzl and Koenick, judges voted to permit a state
holiday for Good Friday justifying their decisions, at least in part,
on the factor that Jews are accommodated on Rosh HaShanah and
Yom Kippur. Judge Manion, dissenting in Metzl,'O remarked
that although Jews represented only 2.3% of the population ,
many schools boards accommodate Jews on these holidays." '
The asseveration was that Christians are not favored over Jews
and therefore, the dissent reasoned, there is no violation of the
Establishment Clause. In Koenick, the court was explicit that
Christians outnumber Jews tenfold and Jews are officially
excused from school on Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur. ' 7 In
contrast, in Litscher, the successful plaintiffs were Jewish
teachers who had to use personal leave to celebrate Rosh
HaShanah and Yom Kippur and the Court agreed that they
sustained injury by reason of the state's favoring Christians in
violation of the Establishment Clause." 8 In Cammack, Jews
were not mentioned.
Although many lessons may be drawn from the Good
Friday cases, I suggest that one relevant to the thesis of this
article is that Jews would be better off taking the Constitutional

246

Id. at 620-21.
Id. at 624.
920 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
Id. at 973-74.
973 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1997).
Id. at 526.
Metzl, 57 F.3d at 626.
Id.

247

Koenick, 973 F. Supp. at 526 n. 2.

239
240
241
242

243
244
245

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Thompson, 920 F. Supp. 969,
974 (W.D. Wisc. 1996).
248
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high ground and not seeking "equal treatment" in state
accommodation of religious holidays even if one could divine
what "equality" would mean. A day-for-day trade-off? Only
"important"
holidays would be counted? All such
accommodation, I maintain, is in a real sense a weakening of the
wall of separation of religion and government, and it is in the
interest of minority religions to preserve that wall high and
impregnable.
In my view, the Jewish school teachers in Freedom From
Religion Foundation249 were right to exercise their right protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to take off
on Rosh HaShannah and Yom Kippur, and other Jewish holidays,
and to oppose the closing of school on Good Friday.
Although unequal treatment among religions surely would
violate the Establishment Clause, "equality" does not guarantee
compliance. 50 "Equality" is the hallmark of "equal protection"
analysis under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and is
basically irrelevant when it comes to separation of religion and
government under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The reason that discrimination against one religion
would violate establishment principles is that favoring another
religion, and normally the majority, usually betrays government
support of religion, which is the principal evil proscribed by the
First Amendment.
Under these circumstances, all references to Jews as
recipients of government favors out of proportion to their
minuscule representation in the population is irrelevant. It also
smacks of judicial political thinking. Nevertheless, realism
demands that all understand how judges think, and if they think
that as long as Jews "get their share," there is nothing "wrong"
in giving some - and usually more - to Christians.

Courts may

use code words such as "secular," meaning "not religious" as that
term is construed under the Establishment Clause, to justify
249

Id.

250 Bd. of Educ. Of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994);
Edwards v.

Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.1
(1947).
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favoring majoritarian religious practice, but it must be understood
that this too is majoritarian thinking and how minorities view any
particular act is rarely considered. Thus, in the cases here
presented, the debate on whether Good Friday is "religious" or
"secular" is purely an intramural squabble among Christians.
How Jews, Moslems, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, atheists, or others
view it is never considered. Nor is Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the topic different.25
There is no doubt that governmental recognition of
religious holidays, of which school closing is but one example,
poses a major dilemma for champions of the Establishment
Clause, among whom Jews ought to be counted. It is a sore point
for observant Jews enrolled in public schools. Schools are closed
on Christmas, the major Christian holiday, and not on major
Jewish holidays, or the holy days of other religions. In
communities where there is a considerable Jewish population
among the students and/or teachers, schools may be closed on the
first day of the 2-day holiday of Rosh HaShanah, and also on
Yom Kippur, but I have not heard of public schools closing on
other holidays such as the four days of Succot, Shemini Atseret,
and Simhat Torah, the four days of Pesach, and Shavuot which
are also major Jewish holidays where the Hebrew Bible
commands "you shall not work at your occupations," which by
practice includes school attendance. m
The judges in the Good Friday cases cited in this section
would hold that where there is a substantial population which
251

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 664 (1984) (reversing two lower courts

and holding that a creche and other Christmas decorations were not
"religious"); the fact that "Christmas," meaning "the mass of Christ" (see
OxFORi ENGLISH DIcTiONARY 392 (1971)), is the term Christians applied to
the symbol is never considered by the Court. See also Allegheny County v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a
Christmas tree similarly was not "religious").
252
The following Jewish holidays are referenced in the Torah as follows:
Rosh HaShannah - Numbers 29:1; Leviticus 23:25; Yom Kippur - Leviticus
23:28; Succot - Leviticus 23:35-9; Shemini Atseret and Simhat Torah Numbers 29:35; Pesach - Leviticus 23:7,39, Numbers 28:18; Shavuot Numbers 28:26.
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would absent themselves on any particular holiday, that alone
would supply the "secular purpose" which would permit the
authorities to close schools without violating the Establishment
Clause. 23 This is disappointing because as Justice Brennan
admonished in the landmark case of Frontiero v. Richardson2"
25 years ago, " administrative convenience" should never be
allowed to defeat a constitutional right.
Ideally, public schools should be open on all religious
holidays and observers, no matter what their religion, would be
entitled to the same option to absent themselves as a matter of
Free Exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment.
Members of majority faiths should have the same opportunity to
exercise that cherished right. That would teach an important
lesson in Constitutional Law - particularly to the majority which
needs the instruction - that the Free Exercise right belongs to all
and members of the majority religions need its protection as well
as the minority. That precious protection does not exist at the
whim or generosity of the majority. It is not merely a reflection
of the majority's tolerance of minorities, with the implication that
it is retractable at any time.
I fully understand the futility of trying to persuade even
educators of changing the school pattern to accommodate these
notions of Constitutional Law. I can only hope that with more
consideration and with the infusion of polyglot populations,
changing demands from changing school constituencies diluting
the dominance of Christians, clamoring to accommodating these
demands will yield more resilience on the part of school
administrators.
For the time being, then, what should be the strategy of
Jews in public schools? The easiest answer is to request as much
"accommodation" as the majority, read "Christians," will allow.
To many Jews this has meant, where there is a significant Jewish
presence, lobbying to close public schools on those Jewish
253

See, e.g,, Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir.
1995)

411 U.S. 677 (1973).
255 Id. at
690.
254
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holidays most Jews deem "important", i.e. the first day of Rosh
HaShanah and Yom Kippur. Sukkot, Shemini Atseret-Simhat
Torah, and Pesach, and Shavuot are abandoned although if
Christians close schools on Good Friday, Jews may be able to
trade off a day for Pesach. Shavuot comes late enough in the
calendar most years that it often is not a problem. And those
pious Jews who observe the remaining holidays, they absent
themselves and hope that the consequences will not be severe.
Or, Jews will go to private religious schools.
The Good Friday cases persuade me that the strategy is ill
-advised. The Court in Koenick particularly supports this theme.
There, the State of Maryland mandated a 4-day weekend closing
for Easter, Friday to Monday.S 6 A Jewish teacher sued both on
grounds of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection.!m The
district court, pointing out that Jews got off on Rosh HaShanah
and Yom Kippur, but not Pesach, held therefore that it was
equitable for Christians to get time out for their holiday." There
was no violation of the Establishment Clause, the court decided,
for the additional reason that the school was merely
"accommodating" the religious feelings of Christians who
represented 44% of the school population, as many local school
boards had accommodated Jews who represented only 4.3 %.2
Moreover, the Court added, the action of the legislature did not
amount to "endorsement" but rather was motivated by
"administrative convenience," meaning yielding to the majority
religion. That fact that many students would absent themselves
on major religious holidays would make it a waste of time to hold
classes and thus there was a secular reason for closing school."o
The district court distinguished the Seventh Circuit decision in

B6

57

Koenick, 973 F. Supp. at 525.

Id. at 524.

Id. at 526.
259 Id. n. 2. The percentages are cited by the Court
and does not indicate who
makes up the balance of almost 52%.
258

260

Id. at 526.
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Metzl v. Leininger,"' which invalidated on establishment grounds
a state statute closing school on Good Friday.
The opinion seems like a farrago of misapplied
constitutional ideas. First, the notion that giving something to
each religion here involved - Christians and Jews

- somehow

satisfies the demands of the Establishment Clause is dealt with
above.
Second, accommodating the majority, here Christians, has
significantly different consequences, than protecting the rights of
minorities, which is the major objective of the Bill of Rights. As
indicated above, such accommodation virtually eviscerates the
First Amendment principle of separation of church and state.
Third, just because the particular school population has
been accommodated to the point that there are no complaints does
not signal compliance with the separation idea. Quite the
opposite, where the entire school population is of one faith, that
does not justify their religious practices in public school. Rather,
the constitutional lesson - and it is of major importance in the
education of public school children - is that the school is no place
for religion. Just as government must stay out of religion,
religion must stay out of government - and public schools are
government institutions - not because the Constitution mandates
hostility, but because the religion is elevated, not demeaned,
when it attracts adherents because of the power of its ideas, not
the coercion of the public fisc. The presence of such "coercion"
was noted by Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman.' 62
Koenick represented a parade example of a decision
inimical to First Amendment values and should either be reversed
or not followed. Since it is a warning to minorities that they
should not sell their birthright for a mess of porridge, that
yielding to temptation of a minor accommodation endangers
precious constitutional liberties. It is appropriate once again to
recall the admonition of Benjamin Franklin, "Those who would
261

57 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 1995).

505 U.S. 577 (1992).

"[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
262

exercise ...

in a way which establishes a [state] religion .
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give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety,
deserve neither Liberty or Safety."m
6. Kosher food
Another recent attempt by Orthodox Jews to use the
machinery of government for purposes of achieving the ends of
religion shows the extent to which zealots are willing to go to
subvert the Establishment Clause. At their behest, Baltimore
enacted an ordinance banning the sale of food labeled "kosher" if
it does not meet Orthodox Jewish dietary laws as determined by a
board of Orthodox Jewish rabbis and lay experts selected by
Orthodox Jewish organizations. In 1995, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Barghout v. Bureau of
Kosher Meats and Food Contro66 enjoined the ordinance as a
violation of the Establishment Clause. In 1992, a similar statute
was invalidated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.2 6
Barghout relied upon the Lemon v. Kunzman analysis and
held that the "kosher" ordinance was unconstitutional on its face
in that it fostered an excessive entanglement of religious and
secular authority by vesting significant investigative, interpretive,
and enforcement power in a group of persons - Orthodox Jews,
rabbis and lay persons - based on their membership in a specific
religious sect. The United States Supreme Court made it clear in
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,m and most recently in Kiryas
Joel, that a legislature may not only not delegate governmental
functions to a sectarian group, but also may not otherwise
"identify] ... recipients of governmental authority by reference to

doctrinal adherence."20
The ordinance was presented to counter fraud, and thus
passed prong one of Lemon requiring a secular legislative
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995).
265 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353 (1992).
266 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
267 66 F.3d 1337.
263

264
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purpose. It failed, however, not only prong three against
excessive entanglement, but also ran afoul of the all-important
prong two because its primary effect was to advance or endorse
religion. 268 Two concurring judges added a more basic violation,
namely, that it facially favors one religious sect over another.269
It takes little imagination to discern that the federal judges
deciding Barghout considered the Orthodox maneuver here an
exercise in Constitutional chutzpa!
C. Discrimination in Violation of the Right of Free Exercise of
Religion No Excuse for Violating the Establishment Clause
Nothing said here is meant to imply that Jews and all
religious persons should not take vigorous action to enforce their
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. I would go
further and submit that minority religions have been shabbily
dealt with by the United States Supreme Court. Perhaps the low
point in judicial protection of free exercise rights for these
minorities came in the 1990 decision of the Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith17 holding that the Native American
Church had no First Amendment free exercise right to ingest a
small amount of peyote as required by the religion.17' The rule
announced by Justice Scalia was that if the state passes a neutral
law - here no drugs - there is no Constitutional right to an

exemption even if the effect is to prevent the exercise of any
particular religion.27

Congress enacted The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993 to overrule that decision and restore the previous test of

Id.
269 Id. at 1346 (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
266

270
271
272
273

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

Id. at 890.

Id.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141 (Nov.

16, 1993) (invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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Sherbert v. Verner274 and Wisconsin v. Yodezs that any legislation
of general applicability that places a substantial burden upon the
free exercise of religion requires government to prove that it has
a compelling interest in enacting the legislation and that it has
used the least restrictive means to further that interest. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,27 the Supreme Court invalidated the Act as
beyond the powers of Congress and a violation of the principle of
separation of powers.2n

Jews have borne more than their share of discrimination.
In Braunfeld v. Brown7 , the Court denied the right of Orthodox
Jews to do business on Sunday when Blue Laws required them to
close on that day and the Torah mandated no work on Shabbat.W
274
275
276
277
276

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
Id. at 2172.
But see the study of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the

Mormons) submitted to the Supreme Court as an appendix to its amicus brief
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), to the effect that Jews do
best among all religions in the Supreme Court of the United States. 60:2 Voice
of Reason, Newsletter of Americanfor Religious Liberty 3 (1997).
279 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2M Id. In Braunfeld, the Court in essence
characterized the argument of the
Jews as economic because they had to stay closed two days, Saturday, as
required by the Torah, and Sunday, as required by the state. Id. at 601. There
was no contention that the Jewish religion mandated that Jews work on
Sunday, and thus, no assertion of violation of the Free Exercise clause.
One wonders whether the Jews would have won had they argued that the Ten
Commandments, Exodus 20:9; 34:21, required Jews to work six days and rest
on the seventh, and the state in barring Sunday labor violated the right of the
Jews under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Exodus 20:9-10
reads, "Six days shall you labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a
sabbath of the Lord your God: you shall not do any work." Since it is
preceded in vs. 8 with, "Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy," the
rabbis emphasize sabbath observance to the neglect of the injunction to work
six days. See M.M. KASHER, Exodus, 16 TORAH SHEMIAH 69-71 (American
Biblical Encyclopedia Society, Inc., New York, 1955); NAHUM SARNA,
Exodus, THE JPS TORAH COMMENTARY 111-112 nn 8-10 (The Jewish
Publication Society, Philadelphia, 1991).
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Yet, in Sherbert v. Verner.. Christian Seventh Day Adventists
won essentially that right which Jews lost. As to Sunday closing

laws in general, it was the Jewish perception as far back as a
century ago that this discrimination was an axiom of "the general
tendency on the part of even the higher courts that this is a

Christian country, and that legislation which" is in conflict with
the doctrines of Christianity cannot be allowed to prevail." 28
In Goldman v. Weinberger,"3 an Orthodox rabbi serving
as a psychologist in the armed forces was denied the right to wear
a yarmulke which he had worn for four years without incident

because a military regulation proscribed the wearing of headgear
indoors. ' He not only lost the Free Exercise argument which he
raised but the court overlooked the obvious establishment issue of

conforming to church practice.

That point was not raised.

It

But there is clearly a separate command to work six days. See Arnold B.
Ehrlich, 1 MIKRA KI-PHESCHUTO 172, (Ktav Pub. House New York, 1969).
Ehrlich points out the parallel phrase on the command to eat matzah six days
in Deuteronomy 16:8. Moreover, Exodus 34:21, reads," Six days shall you
work, but on the seventh day you shall cease from labor." The emphasis here
is clearly on six days work without any mention of Shabbat.
Either way, with or without reference to Shabbat, Orthodox Jews have a claim
that they must work six days and the state Blue Laws interfere with this
religious command.
This construction of the Fourth Commandment was rejected by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a defense to a conviction of a Jew for
performing "worldly employment or business on the Lord's day, commonly
called Sunday." Commonwealth v. Wolf, III Sergeant and Rawles Rep. 48, 49
(Pa. 1817). Said the Court, "the Jewish Talmud, containing the traditions of
[the Jewish] people, and the Rabbinical constitutions and explications of
[Jewish] law, asserts no such doctrine." Id. at 50.
At that time, the convicted Jewish worker could not raise any First
Amendment issues because the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. See
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 243 (1833).
This was changed by the 14th Amendment in 1868. See Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
281 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
282 12 JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA 365 (Funk
and Wagnalls Co. New York and
London 1906).
283
284

475 U.S. 503 (1986).
Id. at 504.
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took Congress years to enact legislation to change the regulation
permitting the wearing of the yarmulke.m
Many lower court decisions may also be cited not only for
unfair judicial rulings against Jews but also striking down
For example, LeBlancdiscriminatory laws against Jews.
Sternberg v. Fletcher,2m invalidated an ordinance of the Village of
Airmnont restricting religious services in private homes as a
discrimination against Orthodox Jews.2
For Jews to respond to discrimination against them in

derogation of their rights under the Free Exercise Clause, by
retaliating against the Establishment Clause, is not only
unavailing, but serves to undermine one of the two pillars erected
by the First Amendment to protect Free Exercise rights. Justice
Brennan, in his concurrence in Schempp, emphasized the role of
the Establishment Clause as a co-guarantor, with the Free
Exercise Clause, of religious liberty.2m The Framers did not
entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone. The
Free Exercise Clause "was not to be the full extent of the
Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion
in matters of faith. "m

Prominent First Amendment scholars agree, and interpret
the religion clauses recognizing that "establishment" and "free
exercise" serve a single value - protecting the individual's
freedom of religious belief and practices, with "free exercise"
barring the curbing of that freedom through penalties and

285

In 1987 Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L.

No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1997)).
The current code permits members of the military to "wear an item of religious
apparel while wearing the uniform," unless "the wearing of the item would
interfere with the performance [of] military duties [or] the item of apparel is
not neat and conservative." 10 U.S.C. § 774.
287

67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996).
Id. at 434.

288

Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
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"establishment" barring inhibitions on individual choice that arise
from governmental aid to religion."O
Bringing down the temple of Dagon upon the head of Sampson
with the cry, "Let me die with the Philistines!" may have served
the ends of the Israelites in Biblical times,291 but to pull down the
Establishment Clause pillar because of disappointing infirmities in
the Court's preservation of the Free Exercise Clause pillar, will
destroy perhaps the staunchest protection of religion the Children
of Israel ever had in foreign lands.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I reiterate that the First Amendment, and
the Constitution generally, are not only the crowning jewels in
our Constitutional democracy, they are also good for the Jews!
Jews should draw inspiration from their heritage, which in my
view also inspired the authors of the American Charter of Liberty
in their efforts to create a system of government most able to
serve the dignity of the individual.
The failure of Jews to get the full benefit of the Free
Exercise Clause is no excuse for them to tear down the
protections of the Establishment Clause. Orthodox 2 Jews seem
determined to chip away at the wall of separation between
religion and state. Whether the subject is religious symbols in
public places, public money for religious schools, special school
districts for handicapped Orthodox students, school prayer,
closing public schools on Jewish holidays or state enforcement of
the Jewish laws of kashrut, it brings the Jews so close to the
destruction of the wall of separation that one should wonder at the
strategy. If, as I submit, the Establishment Clause is good for the
Jews as well as good for America, what is to be served by
290
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Judges 17:30.

See, e.g., Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 2481 (1994).
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tempting the fates that may bring down the wall which affords
such protection for minorities?

Indeed, for example, with nothing of value for Jews to
gain by putting up religious symbols in public places, it is bound
to encourage their enemies to pollute the landscape with symbols
hateful to them, and bystanders are likely to proclaim, "A plague

o' both your houses!" 29
Efforts to destroy the First Amendment freedom of speech
clause by attacking the right to speak is another exercise in failed
tactics.
For me, the Bible and the Constitution, and particularly
the First Amendment, stand as twin sources of inspiration and I
draw deeply from both. I would like to persuade other Jews to
my point of view and actively participate in the struggle to make
it a living credo. I again cite the Brandeis admonition that "the
greatest danger to liberty lies in an inert people."2
But even if I fail to persuade, at the very least I believe
that I have made the case that right-thinking Jews are not all on
the right, that Jews who subscribe to the liberal agenda, and even
further left, are just as good Jews and their credentials are

coruscatingly intact.29 Aware of the suspicion cast upon them,
they act out of a knowing Judaism. B'tslem elohim barah oto.2
293 WiLLiAM

SHAKEsPEARE, RO EO AND JuLIET, act 3, sc. I, verses 95 (3

THE ANNOTATED SHAKsPEARE 104, Rowse ed., C.N. Potter 1978).

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 275 (1927).
295Justice Aharon Barak, now President of the Supreme Court
of Israel, ruled
that in a democratic society even the most hideous expression must be
protected. The case involved the controversial play "Ephraim Returns to the
Army" in which an Israeli soldier dealing with an Arab boy is compared to a
Nazi storm trooper torturing a Jewish child in the ghetto. In overruling the
censor's ban, Justice Barak wrote, "Imyself was a child during the Holocaust
and crossed fences and borders guarded by the German army carrying
forbidden articles on my body. The parallel between a German soldier
stopping this boy and a Israeli soldier who detains an Arab youth sears my
heart. However, we live in a democratic society and this searing of the heart
is the very heart of democracy.* Laor v. Film and Play Supervising Bd., 41(l)
P.D. 421, 441 (H.C.J Israel 1987) (Hebrew).
296 Genesis 1:27. "In the image
of God He created him."
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